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Essays in International Economics
Jing Zhou
The three chapters of my dissertation study the macroeconomics and firm dynam-
ics under financial frictions and institutional frictions. They contain both theoretical
and empirical analysis with a special emphasis on the scope of open economy and
the implications on policy.
Chapter 1 presents a theoretical framework to study the debt portfolio choice and
optimal capital control policy in an open economy with financial frictions. I extend the
model of international borrowing with collateral constraint to allow for multiple debt
maturities. As in the single-maturity version of the model, the equilibrium exhibits
overborrowing because, due to a pecuniary externality, private agents undervalue the
cost of financial liabilities that demand repayment in future constrained states. I show
that in the multiple-maturity model overborrowing in short-term debt is especially
severe because the repayment of short-term liabilities is larger than that of long-term
liabilities in future constrained states, resulting in greater cost undervaluation of short-
term financial obligations. To counteract these inefficiencies, the model justifies a set
of maturity-dependent capital controls. The model predicts a tightening of capital
controls tilted toward short maturities during financial crises. When calibrated to
Argentine data, the model reproduces the observed dynamics of debt portfolios,
and the short-term targeting of capital controls during crises. The optimal capital-
control policy reduces the frequency of crises by half and generates sizable welfare
improvements.
Motivated by the policy implications of Chapter 1, the second chapter of my dis-
sertation presents an empirical study of how capital control policies are implemented
in financial crises. I construct a novel measure of capital control stringency and
establish three stylized facts about the capital control changes around financial crisis.
First, capital control policies do not show significant changes until the onset of finan-
cial crisis (procyclicality). Second, not only outflow controls but also inflow controls
are strengthened upon the arrival of financial crisis (dual tightening). Third, inflow
controls show strong emphasis towards curbing short-term flows, while outflow
controls are generally enhanced with respect to a wide range of flows regardless of
their maturities (short-term maturity targeting). These patterns are robust to countries
with different economy stances, external indebtedness, exchange-rate regimes and
capital control levels.
Besides the financial frictions, the institutional frictions also play important roles
in the external finance. Therefore, the third chapter of my dissertation examines
the role of public governance quality in determining the composition of a country’s
external liabilities and the capital structure of firms. In this joint work with Shang-Jin
Wei, we first build a model with firm heterogeneity to show that better institutional
quality tends to promote a higher share of foreign direct investment and equity
investment in total foreign liabilities, and a higher share of long-term debt within the
debt/loan category. Similar prediction holds for the capital structure of firms. We
then conduct extensive empirical investigation by exploring both firm level data and
country level data and find supportive evidence for these predictions.
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Financial Crises, Debt Maturity, and Capital Controls
1.1 Introduction
Episodes of financial crisis are often associated with two patterns that have been
extensively documented: large movements in capital flows1 and drastic shift to
shorter-maturity flows.2 The first pattern, namely the surges and stops in capital
flows, has resulted in a strong push to revamp capital control as an essential form of
regulation.3 Regarding the second pattern about short-term flows, the emerging view
emphasizes that short-term liabilities render an economy particularly vulnerable
to rollover crises or self-fulfilling liquidity crises and that long-term debt should
be favored.4 However, if the risk of short-term debt is correctly perceived and
incorporated in optimal decisions, then the large proportion of short-term debt
means that the gains from increased short-term debt today exceed the expected
costs of financial distress in the future. Therefore, the questions remain: is short-
term liability accumulation inefficient ex ante? Under what conditions does private
agents’ optimization lead to inefficient debt portfolio choice compared with the social
optimal? What should be the design of optimal regulating policies to counteract the
1For the main stylized facts see for instance, Gourinchas et al. (2001), Mendoza and Terrones (2008),
Rogoff and Reinhart (2009), Broner et al. (2013a).
2See Brunnermeier (2009), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), Broner et al. (2013b).
3See Ostry et al. (2010), Rey (2015), Korinek (2017), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), and Bianchi (2011a),
among many others.
4See, for example, Cole and Kehoe (2000), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009), Jeanne (2009).
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inefficiencies?
This paper aims to address these questions from the theoretical perspective. I
argue that with financial frictions, (i) the debt portfolio in the competitive economy
is inefficient in terms of overborrowing and excess short-term debt issuing, and (ii)
these inefficiencies can be eliminated through the adoption of a set of state-contingent
and maturity-dependent capital inflow controls. I develop a small open economy
model where external borrowing is available in multiple maturities yet subject to
collateral constraint and risk-averse international creditors. I use the model to analyze
the mechanism inducing inefficiency, to derive and verify optimal capital control
policy, and to evaluate welfare improvement generated by the optimal policy.
To inspect the underlying mechanism, I build a model that embeds multiple debt
maturities and risk-averse international creditors in a standard collateral constraint
model à la Korinek (2017) and Bianchi (2011a). As in the single-maturity version
of the model, the equilibrium exhibits overborrowing because, due to a pecuniary
externality, private agents undervalue the cost of financial liabilities that demands re-
payment in future constrained states. The key insight of the multiple-maturity model
is that overborrowing in short-term debt is especially severe because the repayment
of short-term liabilities is larger than that of long-term liabilities in future constrained
states. Therefore, pecuniary externality leads to two sorts of inefficiency in private
agents’ debt portfolio decision: (i) overborrowing regardless of debt maturity, which
is in line with the literature such as Korinek (2017) and Bianchi (2011a), and more
importantly (ii) excess short-term debt issuing, which is new to the literature.
How does pecuniary externality play a role in shaping debt portfolio? In the
model, optimal debt portfolio is determined by two sets of trade-offs: inter-temporal
trade-off and the intra-temporal trade-off. On the inter-temporal perspective, private
agents trade off between the current benefit of borrowing and the associated future
2
repayment cost. However, the repayment cost is undervalued in the future states
where collateral constraint binds. This undervaluation arises because by taking
collateral price as given, private agents evaluate the cost of repayment as the utility
loss from the direct one-to-one consumption decrease. However, they neglect that,
with collateral constraint binding, debt repayment triggers financial amplification:
consumption decrease lowers collateral price and value, limits borrowing capacity,
and further constrains consumption. This contractionary spiral magnifies the future
repayment cost, yet it is not internalized by private agents.
On the intra-temporal perspective, the key difference between the short- and
long-term debt is the amount of required repayment. Given current short-term
borrowing rate, its demanded repayment is independent with next period’s states.
On the contrary, the price of long-term debt decreases in response to interest rate
hike, which is often associated with future crisis states, exhibiting insurance against
adverse shocks. Therefore, long-term debt’s repayment cost is effectively low in future
collateral constrained states. Given the same undervaluation per unit repayment, the
low repayment level of long-term debt leads to milder cost undervaluation than that
of the short-term, resulted in excess short-term debt issuing.
In order to counteract these inefficiencies stemming from pecuniary external-
ity, I prove that the social optimal debt portfolio can be decentralized by a set of
state-contingent and maturity-dependent capital controls, and I derive a close-form
solution for the capital control taxes. To shed further light on the design of capital con-
trol policy, I analyze two aspects: cyclicality and maturity-dependence. I first focus on
the cyclicality, which is equivalent to the cyclicality of the level of undervaluation in
future repayment cost. The magnitude of this undervaluation is determined by two
factors: the probability of future crisis and the magnitude of financial amplification
effect. Due to the persistence of shocks, crisis in current period indicates a high
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probability of future crisis, and the low consumption in crisis leads to a large financial
amplification effect. Therefore, pecuniary externality in crisis exceeds that in normal
time, which directly yields capital controls tightening for both short- and long-term
inflows in crisis.
Another important feature of the optimal capital control policy is the short-term
inflow targeting, which hinges on the relative magnitude of repayment cost underval-
uation between short-term debt and long-term debt. Essentially, this level of relative
undervaluation can be decomposed into the product of (i) the undervaluation of
future cost per unit of repayment (ii) the magnitude of repayment difference between
short-term and long-term debt. The former peaks in crisis, following the same logic
as in the analysis of cyclicality. The latter is the new ingredient, which is governed
by the term premium. As is supported by the data, term premium surges in crisis.
Therefore, compared with the long-term debt, the repayment cost of short-term debt
is more undervalued, and most severely undervalued in crisis, which requires tighter
short-term inflow control in general, and especially tighter in crisis.
When calibrated to Argentine data, the model can reproduce external borrowing
collapse, maturity shrinking, and the behavior of the key aggregate variables in crisis.
The model also successfully generates the overborrowing and excess short-term debt
of the competitive economy compared with the social optimum. In terms of the
optimal capital control policies, the model derives a set of capital inflow taxes that
hike in crisis and target short-term inflow.
The quantitative analysis also shows significant welfare improvements by the
optimal capital controls. Crisis frequency drops by half, and the severity of crisis is
substantially alleviated, for instance, the magnitude of tradable consumption decrease
reduces by 17%, the real exchange rate depreciation is 24% smaller. On average, the
improvement in life-time utility is equivalent to 0.59% consumption increase. The
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welfare analysis also demonstrates the importance of distinguishing maturity in
capital controls because the maturity-independent capital controls can only achieve
half of the welfare improvement generated by the maturity-dependent counterpart.
Comparing the welfare effects by short-term inflow control and that of the long-term,
the analysis shows that the welfare improvement from exclusive long-term inflow
control produces only 10% of that from exclusive short-term inflow control. This
result indicates that if policymakers are constrained in policy tools then short-term
inflow control should be set as the priority.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the related
literature. Section 1.3 presents the empirical facts about external borrowing in fi-
nancial crisis episodes. Section 1.4 builds a dynamic small open economy model
including external borrowing under collateral constraint with different maturities
and risk-averse international creditors. Section 1.5 discusses the main mechanism
relating debt portfolio choice and optimal capital control policy, and it also presents
the model calibration, the quantitative results, and the optimal policy evaluation.
Section 1.6 concludes and discusses possible future extensions.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes towards four main strands of literature. First, this paper
adds to the growing quantitative studies of pecuniary externality due to collateral
constraints and the remedies. Seminal papers of Korinek (2017), Jeanne and Korinek
(2010), and Bianchi (2011a), show the presence of market price in collateral constraint
generates pecuniary externality which calls for capital controls. Recent papers have
extended the model in different directions, for instance, production economy as
Benigno et al. (2013), alternative policy instruments as Benigno et al. (2016a), time
consistent policy as Bianchi and Mendoza (2013) and Devereux et al. (2015), cyclicality
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of capital control as Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017). However, the existing works
have focused exclusively on the interaction between pecuniary externality and short-
term debt.5 This paper builds on these studies by introducing endogenous debt
maturity structure and showing that pecuniary externality leads to inefficiencies in
not only quantity of debt but also maturity structure of debt. These dual effects
of pecuniary externality give rise an extra layer in optimal policy design that both
state-contingency and maturity-dependence are necessary to restore social optimal
equilibrium.
Second, this paper is related to the literature on the optimal maturity structure
of debt. There has been a growing strand of works studying the maturity structure
of sovereign debt, including Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Arellano and Rama-
narayanan (2012), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), Broner et al. (2013b), and Aguiar
and Amador (2013), rationalizing the relationship between maturity structure, bor-
rowing cost, and default decision. Different from their focus on the financial friction
resulted from no repayment commitment, I study another form of financial friction as
the limit of borrowing capacity based on the pledged collateral. Despite the difference
in modeling financial friction, this paper shares a similar logic with the defaultable
debt literature in the trade-off underlying optimal maturity choice, such as the in-
surance benefit of long-term debt and the cost benefit of short-term debt. Moreover,
I focus on the external borrowing from the private sector and the ineffcient in the
competitive equilibrium compared with social optimum, and this new angle provides
the room for studying policy interventions. Within the defaultable debt literature,
there have been works discussing the disavantage of short-term debt in terms of
rollover risk and self-fulling liquidity risk, for instance, Cole and Kehoe (2000), Alfaro
5One important exception is Korinek (2017), which discusses the general principle of capital control
tax with respect to different types of capital flows. However, it does not endogenize the maturity
structure of external borrowing and its interaction with capital control policy.
6
and Kanczuk (2009), and Jeanne (2009). However, this paper differs from them in
analyzing the ex ante efficiency of debt portfolio choice and provide a close form
illustration of the optimal policy. There is also a large literature in corporate finance
on the optimal maturity structure of debt. Recent developments include short-term
debt and rollover risk, including Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009), He and Xiong (2012),
Farhi and Tirole (2012), and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013). Instead of these static
models, this paper examines the optimal maturity structure and its cyclical features
in a dynamic framework where financial crises endogenously rise.
Third, the theoretical implication of capital control policies during financial crisis
episodes is related to the recent literature on capital control policy implementation
in practice. Fernández et al. (2015a) provide a comprehensive analysis showing
that capital control is acyclical. Focusing on the sovereign default crises, Na et al.
(2014a) find that capital controls are significantly tightened. This paper contributes
the literature by analyzing the dynamics of capital control policies in a new set of
important economy episodes: financial crises. Similar to Na et al. (2014a), I also find
capital controls are more restricted in the bust of crisis episodes. Combining with the
existing evidence, this implies there might be non-linear relationship between capital
control policies and business cycle in a way that the policy is likely to respond to only
severe shocks in economy. As a result, capital control policy seems not responding to
business cycle in general but only to significant economy fluctuations.
1.3 Stylized Facts on External Borrowing in Financial
Crises
This section examines the patterns of private external borrowing in financial crisis
episodes. Specifically, this analysis focuses on the amount of private external borrow-
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ing, the maturity choice, and the capital inflow regulations around financial crisis
episodes. The external borrowing data shows that the amount of private external
borrowing collapses during financial crises and the private debt portfolio significantly
tilts towards short-term borrowing, consistent with the literature.
1.3.1 External Borrowing and Maturity Structure
Utilizing the International Debt Statistics dataset (1970 - 2016) from the World Bank,
I calculate external borrowing as the change in external debt stock in private sector
and measure maturity structure by the share of private sector short-term debt in total
private sector debt. For the interest of financial crises, I focus on the 139 financial
crisis windows (114 countries, 1970 -2011) identified by (Laeven and Valencia, 2013)
and evaluate the changes in the quantity and the maturity composition of private
external borrowing across crisis windows.
Figure 1.1 displays the average of external borrowing and the share of short-term
debt, both normalized as relative to the level three-year prior to crisis, among all the
seven-year financial crisis windows (three-year lags and three-year leads). It can be
drawn that upon the arrival of financial crisis, private external borrowing remarkably
moves away from the pre- and post-crisis levels. On the amount of external borrowing,
the total debt issuance falls by 60% compared to the pre-crisis level. On the maturity
composition of external debt portfolio, the share of short-term debt increases by
more than 30% from the normal time’s level. Figure A1 and Figure A2 provide
further evidence about the collapse in external borrowing and increase in short-term
borrowing in typical financial crises such as the Asian financial crises in late 1990s
and the Latin American 1990s crises. The results demonstrate that the changes are
in much greater magnitude than the usual business cycle fluctuations. For instance,
in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand during 1997/1998 financial crisis, the external
8
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Note: This figure plots the dynamics of external borrowing and short-term external debt share in a
seven-year window of 98 financial crises. The magnitude is normalized as relative to 3-year prior to
the starting year of crisis.
borrowing plummted, with a drop of almost 90% from pre-crisis level. Moreover, in all
the crises, the share of short-term debt peaks in the crisis windows, with the increase
at least 11% as compared to the pre-crisis portfolio. These results, although for private
sector in financial crises, are consistent with the facts have been documented for
sovereign external borrowing, for instance, Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) and
Broner et al. (2013b).
1.4 The Model
This section presents a dynamic model with international borrowing in multiple
maturities subject to a collateral constraint. There are three types of agent in the model:
households, tradable goods producers, and international creditors. The structure of
the mdoel goes as follows. The prices of short-term debt and long-term debt qSt , q
L
t
are set by international creditors and taken as exogenous by households and tradable
goods producers in the small open economy. Given the cost of borrowing, tradable
goods producers import tradable intermediate goods to produce, subject to a working
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capital constraint. Given stochastic streams of nontradable goods income (yN), debt
prices (qSt , q
L
t ), and the rebated profit from tradable goods producers, representative
households issue short- and long-term debt under collateral constraint to finance the
optimal consumption allocation. Section 1.4.A illustrates the optimization problem of
each agent, Section 1.4.B explains the first order conditions and defines competitive
equilibrium, Section 1.4.C introduces Ramsey equilibrium and derives the optimal
capital control policy.
1.4.1 Environment
Household – The representative household in the economy receives utility from






where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and u(·) is assumed to have the constant-
relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) form. The total consumption c is constituted by trad-





1−1/ξ + (1− α)(cNt )1−1/ξ
] 1
1−1/ξ
where ξ denotes the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods
and (1− α) ∈ (0, 1) is the home bias.
In every period t, households have two sources of income. The first is an exoge-
nous nontradable endowment yNt , and the second is the profit pit from the tradable
goods production. Besides domestic income, households also have access to the
global financial market by issuing short- and long-term debt. The external borrow-
ings in both maturities are in real term, and it is denominated by tradable goods.
Short-term debt is in the form of one-period discount bond. For one unit of short-term
10
bond issued, borrowers receive qSt unit of tradable goods and international creditors
demand one unit of tradable goods repayment in the next period. Long-term bond
is modeled as a perpetuity contract with deterministic infinite stream of coupons
that decay geometrically at an exogenous constant rate δ, following Hatchondo and
Martinez (2009) and Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012). Specifically, one unit of
long-term bond yields qLt of tradable goods for the borrower upon issuance and
mandates δn−1 of tradable goods repayment for every future period t + n. Therefore,




where dLt is the repayment for long-term debt in period t, and it is the amount of
newly-issued long-term bond in period t. As the bonds are non-defaultable and the
borrower is in a small scale compared with the global financial market, I assume
that qSt and q
L
t are exogenous to the small open economy. With these specifications,

















t+1 − δdLt ) (1.2)
where pt denotes the relative price of nontradable goods in terms of tradable goods,
or equivalently, the real exchange rate.
Although households can finance consumption using international financial mar-
ket, the financing is subject to frictions. I assume that the international creditors
impose a collateral constraint on households as the total value of debt outstanding in







t+1 ≤ κ(pit + ptyNt ) (1.3)
This collateral constraint is in a similar vein as Bianchi (2011a) except for the inclusion
of long-term debt, and it can be viewed as “maintenance margin requirement” fol-
lowing Mendoza and Smith (2006). Essentially, it protects the creditors from default
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by insuring that the face value of debt can be recovered by the market value of the
pledged collateral.6
The collateral constraint affects the dynamics of the small open economy in two
aspects. On one hand, it brings in financial frictions by limiting the amount external
borrowing and lowering welfare compared to the frictionless case. On the other hand,
it introduces pecuniary externality as households take the price of nontradable goods
as exogenous when allocating consumption and borrowing, yet they neglect that the
price is determined by their collective optimal consumption and borrowing choices.
This externality, as will be discussed in details later, differentiates the competitive
equilibrium from social planner’s Ramsey equilibrium, which justifies the importance
of external borrowing regulations.
Tradable Goods Producers – The tradable goods in household’s consumption bun-
dle is produced by the tradable sector using imported tradable goods ft using the
following technology:
yTt = Γ f
γ
t , γ ∈ (0, 1), Γ > 0
I assume that while producing, the producer faces a working capital constraint
such that fraction η of the input factor payment must be paid in advance before
production or sale takes place, and the rest (1− η) can be paid after the production
and sale complete. In order to finance the working capital requirement, firms have
6Following Jeanne and Korinek (2010), the collateral constraint can be micro-founded in the same
way as the moral hazard problem. Assume that international creditors cannot coordinate to punish
the borrower by excluding him from borrowing in future periods. In the meantime, the borrower has
the option to invest in a scam that allows him to remove his future endowment income from the reach
of his current creditors. This would allow him to default on his debts next period without facing a
penalty. However, the creditors can observe the scam in the current period and take the insider to court
before the scam is completed. If they do so, they can seize a fraction κ of the borrower’s collateral,
where κ captures imperfect legal enforcement. The creditor can re-sell the collateral at the prevailing
market price. This implies the participation condition for the creditor to lend to the borrower should
take the form of (1.3).
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to borrow η ft in units of tradable goods (the working capital) at price qSt ,
7, which
will incur interest rate cost ( 1
qSt
− 1)η ft. Therefore, tradable goods producers’ profit
maximization problem can be stated in the following way:
max
ft
pit = Γ f
γ
t − ft − (
1
qSt
− 1)η ft (1.4)
The tradable production sector with working capital constraint connects the econ-
omy’s income to the international financial market conditions, by doing so it provides
a micro-foundation for otherwise exogenously imposed dependence between y and
q.8
International Creditors – I assume risk-averse international creditors and their stochas-
tic discount factor takes the form of Ang and Piazzesi (2003).9










xt+1 = φx0(1− φx1) + φx1 xt + ex,t+1
where xt is the factor in determining international investor’s pricing kernel, ζt is
the time-varying market price of risk associated with the sources of uncertainty ex.
Examples of the shocks to international creditor’s stochastic discount factor could be
7Here the timing is that the loan is made at the beginning of each period and repaid at the end of
the period, so the contemporaneous debt price is used, same as Mendoza (2010). However, Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) Chang and Fernández (2013) use the last period interest rate.
8The link between borrower’s income and borrowing rate has been convincingly justified in the
default literature as income affects the probability of default and hence the price of borrowing. How-
ever, without default, it is less straightforward to associate the external borrowing rate to borrower’s
income other than the collateral constraint channel embedded in the model. Here I take working
capital constraint framework, which is a workhorse model used in analyzing the business cycle of
emerging countries in response to external interest rate, for instance, Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe
and Yue (2006), etc. Alternative justification could be both borrower’s tradable income and lender’s
risk appetite depend on world-wide income shock.
9This specification of the lender’s stochastic discount factor is a special case of the one-factor model
of the term structure, and it has been used in models of sovereign default, for instance, Arellano and
Ramanarayanan (2012), Bocola and Dovis (2016).
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time preference change, world-wide demand shifter, or uncertainty shocks. Note that,
if λt is zero for all t, which means the price of risk is nil, then international creditors
are risk-neutral. To understand why international creditors are risk-averse even they
are able to receive repayments in any state, it is key to note that the effective value
of long-term debt repayment varies with states. For short-term debt, international
creditors will be repaid by one unit in each case next period, therefore, there is no risk.
However, the effective repayment for long-term debt is state-dependent, different
from short-term debt. Specifically, the effective repayment, which is equal to the
present value of all future repayments, is (1 + δqLt+1), which hinges on the future
state in period t + 1. In other words, the effective repayment will be different based
on different values of stochastic discount factor, and this connection between Mt,t+1
and (1 + δqLt+1) yields risk aversion. Essentially, international creditors’ stochastic
discount factor generates a time-varying term premium between short- and long-
term debt, and as will be shown in the next section, time-varying term premium is
critical in the model for interior optimal portfolio solution and the relative magnitude
between short- and long-term capital control taxes.
1.4.2 Competitive Equilibrium
To define the competitive equilibrium, I begin with the optimal condition for the
tradable goods producers’ static profit maximization problem. Producers choose the
amount of imported tradable goods to maximize profit according to (1.4), taking qSt
as given. The producer’s first order condition requires:




It further yields the optimal level of profit









The households’ problem is to choose {cTt , cNt , dSt+1, dLt+1} to maximize the present
discounted value of life-time utility in (1.1) subject to budget constraint (1.2) and
collateral constraint (1.3), given tradable goods production profit (1.5), exogenous




t . The corresponding first order
conditions are:








λtqSt − µtqSt = βEtλt+1 (1.8)




















where βtλt is the Lagrangian multiplier for budget constraint and βtµt is the La-
grangian multiplier associated with collateral constraint. Equation (1.6) requires the
marginal utility of tradable consumption equal to the shadow value of current income.
Equation (1.7) determines the relative price of tradable goods by marginal rate of sub-
stitution between tradable goods and nontradable goods consumption. Equation (1.8)
and (1.9) are the Euler equations associated with short-term debt and long-term debt.
Because of different debt prices and repayment schedule, the short-term and long-
term Euler equations differ from each other in both the contemporaneous benefit of
one unit of debt and the expected cost of the associated future repayment. Compared
to the scenario with financial frictions, collateral constraint lays a wedge between
the present value of consumption and the expected value of future repayment for
both short-term debt and long-term debt. Specifically, as shown in Equation (1.8)
and (1.9), when the financial crisis occurs, meaning collateral constraint binds, the
shadow price of collateral constraint penalizes extra consumption through borrowing
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in both maturities. Finally, equation (1.10) and (1.11) state the slackness conditions of
collateral constraint.
Because nontradable goods can only be consumed domestically and that there is
















t+1 − δdLt ) (1.13)
Definition 1. (Competitive Equilibrium) The competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of
processes {cTt , cNt , dSt+1, dLt+1, pt,pit,λt, µt}∞t=0 satisfying optimal conditions (1.5) to (1.13),
given exogenous processes {yNt , qSt , qLt }∞t=0 and initial debt levels dS0 , dL0 .
1.4.3 Ramsey Equilibrium and Optimal Capital Controls
One important feature of the competitive equilibrium is that agents take the market
prices as given, particularly in choosing debt portfolio, households take the collateral
price (nontradable goods price) as given. Unlike the household in the competitive
equilibrium, social planner recognizes how the aggregate variables, especially non-
tradable goods price, is determined in equilibrium and takes it into account when
determining the optimal external financial decisions. Given this difference, it is impor-
tant to compare private agents’ decision and social planner’s choice, and this section
explains social planner’s optimization problem and its connection to the competitive
equilibrium.
I assume a benevolent social planner who maximizes the life-time utility of house-
holds. The planner can choose debt portfolio for households and let the consumption
portfolio and market price to be determined in the competitive way. Therefore, the
Ramsey equilibrium from social planner’s optimization problem can be defined as
follows.
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Definition 2. (Ramsey Equilibrium) The Ramsey equilibrium is defined as a set of processes
{cTt , cNt , dSt+1, dLt+1, pt,pit}∞t=0 maximizing the present discounted utility (1.1) subject to
collateral constraint (1.3), pricing rule (1.7), and market clear conditions (1.12) and (1.13),
given exogenous processes {yNt , qSt , qLt }∞t=0 and initial debt levels dS0 , dL0 .
Ramsey equilibrium and competitive equilibrium share a number of optimal
conditions, while they significantly differ from each other in choosing debt portfolio.
To shed further light on the difference, it would be useful to analyze the Euler


















where u˜ is households’ marginal utility, µ˜ is the shadow price of collateral, and
Φt ≡ κyNt ∂ p˜t∂c˜Tt , representing the change in collateral value in response to tradable
consumption.
Compared with (1.8), Euler equation (1.8’) contains one additional termE(µ˜t+1Φt+1)
in the evaluation of expected future repayment cost.10 Why is this term neglected by
the private agents? Fundamentally, it is because of the pecuniary externality stemmed
from the presence of the key market price (pN) in collateral constraint, which is taken
as exogenous by private agents. When the collateral constraint binds in the future,
i.e. µ˜t+1 > 0, debt repayment is going to trigger a contractionary spiral through the
feedback loop of consumption decrease, collateral price fall, and borrowing capacity
shrink. However, private agents treat collateral price as given, therefore they fail
to internalize that the feedback loop generates financial amplification effect of debt
repayment, resulting in undervaluing the expected cost of future debt repayment.
10Note that µ˜t = 11−Φt · µt, because social planner internalizes the financial amplification effect of
extra collateral through the feedback loop of consumption increase, collateral value rise, and borrowing
limit relax, when evaluating the shadow price of collateral. This is the same result as Korinek (2017).
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The magnitude of pecuniary externality is determined by the probability of future col-
lateral constraint binding (µ˜t+1) and the financial amplification effect when collateral
constraint binds (Φt+1).
Similar to short-term debt’s Euler equation, the long-term debt’s counterpart (1.9’)





. However, different from short-term debt which requires one unit of repay-




units of “effective” repayment





short-term debt in each future collateral constrained state.
Given the difference between competitive equilibrium and Ramsey equilibrium,
a natural question would be whether the Ramsey equilibrium allocation can be
supported as a regulated competitive equilibrium or not. To analyze the optimal
policy intervention, I follow the literature (i.e. Korinek (2017), Bianchi (2011a), etc.)
and assume that social planner has two policy tools: tax on short-term borrowing and
tax on long-term borrowing, and that the total tax revenue is rebated to household in
a lump-sum way. Specifically, households maximize the present discounted value
of life-time utility given capital control taxes, and the optimization problem can be
formalized as follows.
Definition 3. (Competitive Equilibrium Under Regulation) The competitive equilibrium un-
der capital control policies is defined as a set of processes {cTt , cNt , dSt+1, dLt+1, pt,pit,λt, µt}∞t=0
satisfying optimal conditions (1.5) to (1.13), given exogenous processes {yNt , qSt , qLt }∞t=0,
initial debt levels dS0 , d
L
0 , and capital control taxes {τSt , τLt }∞t=0 maximizing the present dis-
11“Effective” repayment of long-term debt is the discounted present value of all the future payments
of long-term debt. Alternatively, it could be viewed as the cost of retiring one unit of long-term debt.
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t = pit + pty
N
t + (1− τSt )qSt dSt+1 + (1− τLt )qLt (dLt+1 − δdLt ) + Tt
(1.2’)










t+1 − δdLt ).
In order to decentralizing the Ramsey equilibrium, social planner chooses taxes
to maximize household’s present discounted utility while allowing debt portfolio
to be chosen by the private agents given the after-tax debt price, and that goods
market clear competitively under collateral constraint. Accordingly, the optimization
problem can be defined as follows.
Definition 4. (Ramsey Optimal Competitive Equilibrium) The Ramsey optimal competitive
equilibrium is defined as a set of processes {τSt , τLt , cTt , cNt , dSt+1, dLt+1, pt,pit,λt, µt}∞t=0 maxi-
mizing the present discounted utility (1.1) subject to pricing rule (1.7), slackness conditions
(1.10) and (1.11), market clear conditions (1.12) and (1.13), and Euler equations under reg-




λtqSt (1− τSt )− µtqSt = βEtλt+1 (1.8”)







Proposition 1. (Optimal Capital Controls) The Ramsey optimal allocation can be decentral-
ized in a competitive equilibrium with taxes on short- and long-term debt satisfying











where λ˜ is the optimal shadow price of income in Ramsey equilibrium.
The optimal capital control policy (see proof in Appendix A) follows the same
logic as Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017) that social planner can always choose tax
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rates such that individual agents’ trade-off between contemporaneous benefit of
borrowing and the expected future cost of repayment coincides with that of social
planner. Essentially, since the future cost of repayment is undervalued by private
agents, capital control taxes on external borrowing are set to decrease the benefit of
borrowing to balance out the miscalculation of cost.
Summary of the Model – The model differs from a standard collateral constraint
model in small open economy from two aspects: first, instead of one short-term debt,
the model grants borrower the access to long-term debt, which introduces maturity
choice in equilibrium; second, international creditor is risk-averse, which generates
term premium in external borrowing. The economy is driven by stocks in interna-
tional creditor’s stochastic discount factor, whose dynamics will affect the borrowing
cost faced by the small open economy, and consequently, total debt position, maturity
structure, and consumption portfolio. The inefficiency in private agents’ debt matu-
rity structure due to pecuniary externality gives room for policy intervention, and the
state-contingent and maturity-dependent optimal policy is able to correct pecuniary
externality and restore social optimum.
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
This section presents the quantitative analysis of the model. Section 1.5.A describes
the parameterization and compares the key statistics from the competitive economy
simulation to the data. Section 1.5.B discusses the trade-offs that determines the
debt portfolio choice. Section 1.5.C analyzes the cyclicality of optimal capital control
polices. Section 1.5.D inspects the difference between short- and long-term capital
controls. Section 1.5.E studies the optimal debt portfolio in competitive equilibrium
and Ramsey equilibrium. Section 1.5.F evaluates the welfare effect of optimal capital
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controls.
1.5.1 Parameterization and Key Statistics
I calibrate the model to Argentine data (1983 – 2001) with the time unit as one year.
Table 1.1 shows the values of parameters.12 Following Bianchi (2011a), the risk
aversion level is set at 2, the elasticity of substitution between tradable goods and
nontradable goods is set at 0.83, the weight on tradables in CES aggregator is set at
31%, and the collateral constraint tightness κ is set at 0.32. The time discount factor
β is set to be 0.86 to keep β/qS at the same value as Bianchi (2011a). The decaying
rate of long-term bond is set at 0.90 to match the average duration of private sector
external borrowing in the data.
The international creditors’ stochastic discount factor (SDF) and tradable sector
production are new to the literature, and they are calibrated in the following way. For
the SDF, first, I choose the factor xt as the Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond
Spread as the proxy for global risk, and estimate the AR(1) process to obtain φx0 , φ
x
1
and σ2x . Global risk has been shown as an important factor in driving the variation
in interest rate and key macro variables in emerging economy. For instance, Akıncı
(2013) finds that global financial risk shocks explain about 20% of movements both
in the country spread and in the aggregate activity in emerging economies. To shed
further light on the relationship between global risk and the Argentine interest rates,
Figure 1.2 plots the quarterly time series of Baa spread. In particular, in the three
financial crises (1989, 1004, 2001, denoted by the vertical dashed line), Baa spread
significantly rose. Moreover, Moody’s Baa spread has considerable large explanation
power for the variation in Argentine interest rate: a simple regression ln(1+ it) =
12According to Benigno et al. (2016a) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), there might exist multiple
equilibria in the set of collateral constraint models. I discuss the current calibration guarantees unique
equilibrium in Appendix.
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1987q1 1991q1 1995q1 1999q1 2003q1
Note: This figure plots quarterly sequence of Moody’s Baa corporate spread (right axis) and Argentine
short-term interest rate (left axis) from Neumeyer and Perri (2005) from 1987Q1 to 2001Q1.
α+ β ln(1+ spreadt) + et yields β̂ significant at level 0.1% and R2 = 20.1%.
Second, based on the affine property−qSt = φ0 + φ1xt, I use the short-term interest





to match the mean of debt-to-GDP ratio and the mean of short-term debt share. For
the tradable goods production block, Γ,γ, η are set to match the median, standard
deviation of tradable sector output and its correlation with short-term interest rate.
Since risk-averse international creditor is one of the key ingredients that differ the
model from the literature, it would be useful to compare the term structure derived
from the calibration to the data to see whether the model is well grounded by the
reality or not. Figure 1.3 plots the relationship between 12-year over 3-year term
premium and 3-year spread13 for both data and calibration. It shows that the two
13Term structural data is from Broner et al. (2013b). 3-year spread is the shortest in their data, and
12-year is the closest to the equivalent duration of 10-year as calibrated in the data.
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Table 1.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
σ Risk aversion 2
ξ Elasticity of substitution 0.83
α Weight on tradables in CES 0.31
β Discount factor 0.86
κ Collateral constraint 0.32
δ Coupon decaying rate 0.90
Γ Tradable goods production function 2.11
γ Tradable goods production function 0.83










1 , φ0, φ1 international creditor SDF [0.68,0.31,0.97,0.96]
both generate a positive correlation, which indicates that term premium rises when
borrowing rate is high, i.e. bad states. Moreover, the slopes are considerable close.
Since the model is calibrated to private sector external borrowing and the data is from
sovereign bond term structure, one possible explanation for the difference between
the slopes could be the corporate sector spread over sovereign.
The competitive equilibrium is solved using Euler equation iteration, and the
Ramsey equilibrium applies value function iteration. To evaluate the performance of
the model, Table 1.2 reports the key second moments from data and in the simulated
competitive equilibrium. The model is able to generate qualitatively similar moments
to the data.
Table 1.2: Statistics: Model and Data
Nontargeted Model Data Targeted Model Data
Stdev total consumption 4.8 6.2 debt/GDP 29.3 30.6
Stdev real exchange rate 4.8 8.2 short-term debt/debt 23.2 20.3
Stdev trade balance to GDP 2.7 2.4 median yT 0.02 0.01
Corr(GDP, c) 0.92 0.88 Stdev(yT) 0.13 0.11




Corr(GDP, trade balance/GDP) -0.74 -0.84
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Moody's Baa corporate spread %
Data fit Model SDF
Term Premium: 12-year vs. 3-year Sovereign Bonds
Note: This plot shows the relationship between term premium in sovereign bond and Moody’s Baa
corporate spread. The raw date is in blue, and the model indicated relationship is the dashed black
line. Sovereign bond term structure data is from Broner et al. (2013b).
1.5.2 Debt Portfolio
This section analyzes the key forces and the trade-offs faced by the borrowers that
determine the optimal debt portfolio. Essentially, the optimal portfolio is shaped by
two sets of trade-offs: borrowing benefit versus repayment cost, and short-term ver-
sus long-term borrowing. The first trade-off is inter-temporal which is the standard
dynamic consumption allocation. The second trade-off is intra-temporal that is based
on the cost benefit of short-term borrowing and the insurance benefit of long-term
borrowing.
Borrowing Benefit versus Repayment Cost – When determining the total borrow-
ing, the borrower makes sure that the marginal benefit of borrowing and consuming
today is equal to the expected marginal future cost of repayment. Specifically, it can
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be represented by the Euler equation of consumption.
u′Ttq
S
t − µtqSt = βEtu′Tt+1
where µt is the Lagrangian multiplier of collateral constraint. Different from the
frictionless framework, the presence of collateral constraint punishes extra borrowing
if total borrowing already reaches the limit, and this wedge decreases the marginal
utility of borrowing ceteris paribus. As a result, private agents borrow less than if there
is no friction in borrowing. In other words, private agents realize that the desired
future borrowing might be unavailable due to collateral constraint, therefore they
accumulate precautionary saving to cope with the constrained borrowing capacity
in future bad states. Taken together, collateral constraint generates underborrowing
than the frictionless counterpart. Figure 1.4 confirms that the ergodic distribution of
Figure 1.4: Ergodic Distribution of Total Debt: Friction versus Frictionless
















Note: This plot presents the ergodic distribution of total debt in the frictionless economy and in the
economy with collateral constraint, respectively.
total borrowing in the competitive equilibrium with collateral constraint assigns a
higher probability to lower levels of debt.
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Insurance Benefit versus Cost Benefit – When determining the maturity structure of
debt, private agents make sure that, given the total amount of debt, the subjective
discounted expected future repayment cost is the same no matter borrowing short-
term debt or long-term debt. To analyze the benefit and cost of deviating from the
optimal maturity structure by swapping short- and long-term debt, I compare all the
portfolios that yields the optimal consumption level (i.e. keeping total debt position
unchanged) in the current period.14 As the debt price is exogenous, these portfolios
maintain a constant ratio between the quantities of debt equal to the relative price of
debt. If presented in the (dSt+1, d
L










t − cTt − dSt − (1+ δqLt+1)dLt
To evaluate these portfolios, since they yield the same debt and consumption in the
current period, it would be sufficient to compare their present discounted cost of
future repayments. To facilitate the comparison, I restate the borrower’s optimization
problem in the following recursive way.
V(dSt , d
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u(ct) + βEtV(dSt+1, d
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t+1, St+1)



















t+1 ≤ κ(pit + ptyNt )







where St represents the current exogenous states {qSt , qLt , yNt }.
Consider the change in the present discounted value of future utility for a portfolio
that deviates from the optimal maturity structure with replacing short-term debt with
14This analysis has been used in Aguiar and Amador (2013) and Bianchi et al. (2012) to illustrate
maturity choice in defautable debt.
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long-term debt. The overall change stems from two sources: the increase in dLt+1 and
the decrease in dSt+1. Applying envelope theorem, the change in households’ life-time
















The first term on the right-hand side represents the utility gain associated with the
decrease in short-term debt repayment and the second term is the utility loss due to
the increase in long-term debt repayment. The key difference between the two terms
is that the increase in long-term debt repayment (1+ δqLt+1) depends on future states
while the decrease in short-term debt repayment is pre-determined in period t, and
this difference leads to the insurance benefit of the long-term and the cost benefit of
the short-term, respectively.
To gain more insights in the trade-off between insurance and cost, I analyze these
two terms in turns. First, long-term debt provides insurance benefit, and the insurance
is grounded by the negative correlation between borrower’s marginal utility and the
repayment cost of long-term debt. Specifically, in future bad states, borrowing rate
increases, which aggravates the situation as private agents face a high borrowing cost
(low q), and consumption is low, leading to high marginal utility as private agents
are in great needs of consumption. In the meantime, However, the long-term debt
repayment, which effectively is equal to (1+ δqLt+1), decreases in future bad states.
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Therefore, although the high borrowing cost makes it difficult for the borrower to
obtain external financial resource, it reduces the repayment of long-term debt at the
same time. In other words, long-term debt helps to alleviate the adverse future states
by mandating low repayment, which provides insurance for the borrowers.
Second, as the counterforce against long-term debt’s insurance benefit, the low
15Effective repayment of long-term debt is the discounted value of all the future repayments, and
equivalently, it is also the cost of retiring the existing long-term debt with the new market debt price.
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average borrowing cost of short-term debt favors short-term liability accumulation.
Keeping everything else unchanged, consider an extreme case that a negative shock
in the current period and the spread between short- and long-term debt spikes, as a
result, long-term debt price converges to the short-term. In this scenario, it would be
overwhelmingly costly to issue long-term debt as it provides the same funds as the
short-term in the current period while demands more repayment in the future.
Figure 1.5: Insurance Benefit and Borrowing Cost of Long-term Debt Accumulation
0 2 4 6 8 10 12









Note: This chart plots the trade-off associated with swapping short-term debt with long-term keeping
current consumption unchanged. The vertical axis is the net benefit of the swap, and the horizontal
axis is the Moody’s Baa spread. The larger the spread is, the worse borrowing condition faced by the
borrowers. The initial debt is set as the median in simulation.
Figure 1.5 shows the trade-off quantitatively, and it presents the net benefit of
switching to long-term debt on the margin. In the bad states of the next period (high
spread, difficult to borrow from the rest of the world), the repayment is low, which
effectively transfers resources to the future bad state and increases utility. In the
good states of the next period, the low spread induces low borrowing cost, and the
resulted high repayment of long-term debt induces utility loss. With the optimal debt
portfolio, considering both the good and bad states in the next period, the insurance
benefit and the cost benefit should be equal in expected term, which means that the
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weighted average of the values along the solid line is zero.
Having inspected the debt portfolio choice, one natural question is: what is the
role of collateral constraint in shaping the maturity structure? It can be observed that
with or without collateral constraint, the optimal intra-temporal condition remains
the same. Therefore, collateral constraint does not directly influence the insurance
versus cost trade-off. However, collateral constraint still affects maturity structure,
and its impact is indirectly through affecting the total debt position. The reason is that
keeping current utility constant requires total debt staying the same, which means no
matter how the composition of debt changes it will not invoke changes in collateral
constraint. As a result, this intra-temporal trade-off works in the same way as in the
portfolio choice without financial friction. However, as illustrated before, collateral
constraint plays a role in the inter-temporal trade-off and generates precautionary
saving and under-borrowing compared with frictionless case. Given that maturity
composition of debt depends on how much debt is taken in total, hence, maturity
changes along with overall debt position. Taken together, collateral constraint directly
alters aggregate amount of debt, as a side effect, maturity structure also changes.
Figure 1.6 shows how collateral constraint affects the optimal portfolio choice
compared with the frictionless scenario. In the absence of collateral constraint, the
maturity is significantly shorter compared to that with friction. This difference is
resulted from both the low cost of short-term debt and the insurance benefit of
long-term debt. On one hand, as short-term debt is relatively cheaper to borrow as
indicated by the data (high qS, or low rS, equivalently), borrower prefers accumulating
short-term debt. However, issuing short-term debt quickly consumes collateral due
to high qS, therefore, in a friction world, borrower has to sacrifice the low cost of
short-term debt to fulfill the collateral requirement. On the other, as illustrated before,
collateral constraint leads to precautionary saving, which is essentially a buffer for
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Figure 1.6: Ergodic Distribution of Maturity: Friction versus Frictionless
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Note: This plot shows the ergodic distribution of short-term debt share in the frictionless economy
and the economy with collateral constraint, respectively.
future adverse shocks. The insurance benefit of long-term debt aligns well with the
precautionary motive as it helps to transfer resources to future bad states, therefore
private agents borrow more in long-term debt so as to cope with adverse shocks
tomorrow.
1.5.3 Optimal Capital Control Policy in Financial Crisis
This section considers how social planner sets optimal capital control in response to
financial crises. As discussed in Section 1.4.C, the presence of collateral constraint, in
particular the dependence of collateral value on nontradable goods price, induces a
wedge between the expected future cost of repayment perceived by social planner and
by individual agents. To correct the wedge, according to Proposition 1, social planner
can employ taxes on external borrowing to decentralize the Ramsey equilibrium as
a regulated competitive equilibrium. The rest of the section will provide further
insights about the cyclicality of short- and long-term capital controls.
To analyze the optimal capital control in coping with financial crisis, I start with
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defining the crisis period in the model. Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017),
I define the financial crisis period in the model as the periods when the collateral
constraint binds. To characterize the dynamics in financial crisis, I simulate the
competitive economy for one million years. The procedure yields 84,525 crisis periods
(per 11.8 years), and I select a seven-year window (three-year lead and three-year lag)
for each crisis. Using the same stochastic processes, I simulate the Ramsey problem
for one million years, and Ramsey equilibrium generates 37,980 collateral constraint
binding incidents (per 26.3 years), which confirms that the pecuniary externality leads
to more financial crises.
Figure 1.7 presents the evolution (average across all crises windows) of the key
aggregate variables around financial crisis. In general, financial crises in competitive
equilibrium are triggered by plummet in debt prices, or equivalently, spike in external
interest rates. The hike in borrowing cost depresses tradable goods production and
leads to a collapse in total income. Following high borrowing cost and low income,
tradable consumption decreases, and real exchange rate depreciates. On the financial
side, the increase in borrowing cost makes it difficult for the economy to issue debt.
Following the shrink in the tradable goods production and the drop of nontradable
goods price, the value of collateral falls and further reduces the borrowing. Although
both short- and long-term debt price slump, the short-term stays relatively cheaper
to borrow on average. As a result, the external borrowing tilts to short-term during
crisis. Since there is less external financial resource that can be employed to consume,
trade balance improves.
The dynamics in the Ramsey economy shares a similar trend with the competitive
counterpart, however, it shows significantly less severity. To begin with, in the
Ramsey economy, the borrower enters the crisis zone with a substantially lower
debt level than that in the competitive equilibrium. As a result, the borrower has
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Figure 1.7: Dynamics in Financial Crises
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Note: This chart plots the evolution of key aggregate variables in financial crisis window. The
horizontal axis is the number of years away from crisis. Solid line represents competitive economy,
and dashed line is Ramsey economy.
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higher income net debt repayment at disposal and hence suffers less from the adverse
shocks in external borrowing. Therefore, the economy experiences a relatively smaller
scale contraction in output and consumption, a more moderate depreciation in real
exchange rate, and maintains a slightly higher collateral value, external borrowing,
and continues the trade deficit. Overall, the financial crises bring less disturbance to
the Ramsey economy.
The most drastic difference between the Ramsey equilibrium and the competitive
equilibrium comes from the financial side, especially on total borrowing, collateral
value, and maturity structure. In crisis, collateral value in Ramsey equilibrium is
much higher than that of competitive equilibrium, and more sufficient collateral
value grants larger borrowing capacity which plays a significant role in easing the
severity of crises. Furthermore, the Ramsey economy selects an optimal portfolio with
larger proportion of long-term debt than the competitive equilibrium counterpart and
maintains a higher overall maturity upon the occurrence of crisis. The larger weights
on long-term debt benefits the Ramsey economy in two aspects. First, as discussed
before, the long-debt provides insurance for the economy against negative shocks,
hence it helps to cope with the crisis. Second, with higher share of long-term debt
to start with, there is less flight to short-term borrowing in crisis and the relatively
stable share of long-term debt continues helping the economy to survive crisis.
Table 1.3: Crisis Severity Comparison Between Competitive Equilibrium and Ramsey
Equilibrium
∆GDP ∆cT depreciation ∆ debt ∆ tradable balance
Competitive −33.8% −34.1% 44.0% −31.8% 0.33
Ramsey −17.6% −17.7% 20.1% −9.5% 0.20
Note: This table reports the crisis severity comparison between competitive equilibrium and
Ramsey equilibrium in terms of GDP decrease, tradable goods consumption decrease, depreciation
of real exchange rate, debt decrease, and tradable balance increase.
Having established the less severity of financial crisis in Ramsey economy than
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that in competitive equilibrium, I now analyze the characteristics of the optimal
capital control policies that decentralize Ramsey equilibrium as regulated competitive
equilibrium. According to Proposition 1, the optimal capital control taxes can be
derived in close form for both short- and long-term borrowing. Figure 1.8 presents the
optimal capital control policies around financial crisis. The most prominent feature is
that both capital controls are significantly tighten in crisis. Specifically, the magnitude
of tax almost doubles the pre-crisis level for both short- and long-term. Furthermore,
short-term inflow control shows a prominent tightening: the increase in tax rate is
more than 2%, while the long-term counterpart is 1.5%. Despite of the extensive
tightening in capital controls in crisis, the increase in capital controls is short-lived.
The taxes immediately drop in one year after the crisis, they continue the decline
trend and return back to the pre-crisis level in three years.
Within crisis periods, the sudden-stop periods are of great interest in analyzing ex-
ternal borrowing and optimal regulations. Typically, sudden-stop starts with financial
crashes and severe deterioration in external financial condidtion, and it is followed by
deep recessions that differ markedly from typical business cycles. Examples include
Latin America Crisis (1994), East Asian Crisis (1997), and Russian Crisis (1998). In
order to examine these episodes, I define sudden-stop following Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2017), I define a boom-bust episode as a window where tradable production
profit starts above trend and is below trend three years later. Figure A3 displays
the dynamics of key aggregate variables and optimal capital controls. The trend in
aggregate variables is similar to crisis but changes are more pronounced. For instance,
total income drops by 50% compared to 25% in standard crisis, and total debt shrinks
to half of the boom size while it only decreases by 20% in standard crisis. On the
policy side, optimal capital control taxes also increase in sudden stop periods, and the
magnitude of capital control tightening also substantially exceeds those in standard
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crisis.
Figure 1.8: Optimal Capital Control in Financial Crisis Window
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Note: This plot shows the dynamics of capital control taxes of short-/long-term debt in financial crisis episode,
respectively.
To shed further light on the cyclicality of short- and long-term capital controls,
it is useful to go beyond the crisis episodes. To this end, Figure 1.9 provides the
unconditional relationship between overall income of the economy and the level of
capital controls of all the states. As can be observed, there is remarkable variation in
capital control taxes across different states of the economy, indicating social planner
needs to actively tune capital control taxes to regulate the individual agents in order to
achieve the Ramsey optimal allocation. Considering how capital controls change with
respect to aggregate conditions, there are three important patterns. Firstly, capital
control tax is positive even in normal times, which indicates that the optimal capital
flow regulation is macroprudential. Secondly, capital controls are tighter in bad states
than good states. In normal times, the capital control taxes are low in magnitude with
small variation. To the contrary, the capital control taxes are higher on average and
also more volatile in crisis. Thirdly, in normal time, the capital regulation policy does
not show strong correlation with aggregate state. However, there is a pronounced
negative relationship between the level of capital control taxes and the aggregate
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economy condition.
Figure 1.9: Cyclicality of Optimal Capital Control
Note: This plot shows the unconditional relationship between capital control tax and GDP. Short- and
long-term debt taxes are plotted on the left panel and the right panel, respectively. In each plot, crisis
periods are shown in red plus, and normal periods are shown in blue dot.
The previous analysis focused on the shock that introduced changes in domestic
interest rates. Although the interest rate shock plays an important role in the business
cycle dynamics of emerging economies,16 another equally crucial shock is the output
shock. Figure A4 shows that with additional shock from nontradable endowment, in
financial crises, the key aggregate variables exhibit similar dynamics as that under
interest rate shock. More importantly, the tax rate on short-term inflow is also larger
than that on the long-term in general, and the difference is much remarkable during
crises.
Inspecting the Mechanism – Essentially, capital control taxes are imposed to cor-
rect the pecuniary externality rising from the fact that private agents neglecting the
contribution of their consumption/borrowing decision through the feedback loop
of consumption, collateral price, and borrowing capacity. As discussed in Section
16See Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006) among many others.
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1.4.C, pecuniary externality results in undervaluing the expected future repayment




in the inter-temporal trade-off.
Therefore, the cyclicality of short- and long-term capital control taxes is determined
by the cyclicality of the magnitude of undervaluation.
The magnitude of undervaluation can be decomposed to two parts: the probability
of future collateral constraint binding (µ˜t+1) and the financial amplification effect
(Φt+1). The probability of binding collateral constraint affects undervaluation because
it is the prerequisite of activating financial amplification. Intuitively, if the collateral
constraint is slack, suggesting that the original collateral value is sufficient to support
the unconstrained optimal borrowing, the marginal change in debt repayment will not
affect the optimal consumption decision. Conditional on binding collateral constraint,
the financial amplification effect represents the overall decrease in future utility
induced by extra unit of debt repayment through the feedback loop of consumption
decrease, collateral price fall, and borrowing limit contraction. Taken together, the
product of these two terms stands for the undervaluation in future debt repayment
cost.
When do future collateral constraint binding probability and financial amplifica-
tion effect take a large value? The answer is crisis time. During normal time, due to
persistent shock, the probability of binding collateral constraint in the next period
is relatively low. Also, when collateral constraint is slack, typically consumption is
relatively high, and price is not very responsive to demand increase which means low
financial amplification effect. To the contrary, during financial crisis, the probability
of continuing crisis is high (collateral constraint binds). In the meantime, with low
level of consumption, small demand increase is able to generate large increase in
price, which yields a significant financial amplification effect. Therefore, the under-
valuation is more severe if current period is in crisis. In other words, private agents
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over-borrow because of undervaluing future repayment cost, especially in crisis time
compared with the optimal level in Ramsey equilibrium. Therefore, it is optimal
to raise capital control in crisis to lead the private agents effectively internalize the
pecuniary externality and restrain themselves from excess borrowing.
1.5.4 Comparison Between Capital Control Policy for Short- and
Long-term Borrowing
Last section examines the general pattern of capital controls and shows that the
optimal capital controls are tightened in crisis which aligns well with what is observed
in reality. Having established the cyclicality, this section analyzes the short- and long-
term optimal capital controls individually and examines the mechanism that leads to
their different patterns.
As indicated in Figure 1.8 and 1.9, short- and long-term capital controls vary from
each other in both magnitude and the response to economy-wise fluctuations. To
provide a closer look at the comparison, Figure 1.10 presents the cumulative density
function of the ratio between short- and long-term capital control taxes on overall
levels, τS/τL, and on the changes in crises, ∆τS/∆τL, (relative to one-period prior to
crisis). On the magnitude side (left panel), the tax on short-term debt is greater than
the long-term counterpart almost all the time which suggests that the optimal capital
controls always impose more restrictions on short-term borrowing. On the change
side (right panel), the increase in short-term capital control tax constantly surpasses
that in long-term which means that short-term borrowing is tightened by a larger
extent in crises. Altogether, the optimal short-term capital control tax exceeds the
long-term counterpart in both level and the response to crises.
The Role of Term Premium – This part demonstrates that the positive term premium
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Figure 1.10: Comparison Between Short- and Long-term Capital Controls
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Note: This plot shows the cumulative density function of the ratio between short-term debt tax and
long-term debt tax (on the left) and that of the ratio between the increases in short-term flow tax and
long-term flow tax in crisis (on the right).
is the key that drives the distinct patterns of short- and long-term optimal capital
controls. To do so, I start with the trade-off between cost benefit and insurance benefit
in maturity selection to see the role of pecuniary externality. I then show that the
magnitude of pecuniary externality depends largely on term premium and provide
intuition that small term premium may fail to derive short-term inflow targeting.
Finally, I consider a counterfactual case with small term premium and show that
short-term inflow control is virtually the same as the long-term.
In the model, term premium, defined as the difference between the effective
interest rate on a long-term bond and the short-term interest rate over the same






It plays a crucial role in affecting the pecuniary externality rooted in maturity choice.
To see the pecuniary externality borne in maturity choice, it would be useful to
compare social planner’s optimal condition for maturity choice trade-off with private
agents’ counterpart. As shown in the equation below, social planner’s optimal
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condition contains an extra term, Et
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What does the pecuniary externality term stand for in the insurance benefit of
long-term debt? Fundamentally, insurance benefit of long-term debt stems from the
fact that long-term debt’s effectively repayment is smaller than that of short-term
debt in bad states, bringing in resource to future adverse states, as confirmed by
Figure 1.5. The pecuniary externality term, Et
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difference between the undervaluation of repayment cost associated with short-term
debt and long-term debt, and this relative cost undervaluation leads to inefficient
maturity structure and calls for maturity-dependent capital control policies.
To shed light on the extent of maturity-dependence and how short- and long-
term inflow controls should differ from each other, it is important to analyze the
variation in the magnitude of the relative cost undervaluation between short-term
debt and long-term debt along business cycle. Basically, the pecuniary externality
here represents the expected marginal utility from swapping to long-term borrowing
through the collateral price and borrowing limit feedback loop. Therefore, the total
pecuniary externality can be decomposed to two parts: one is the undervaluation
of future repayment cost per unit of repayment, and the other is the amount of
repayment decrease due to the insurance benefit of long-term debt. As shown in
the cyclicality of capital control, the first component peaks in crisis due to the large
probability of collateral constraint binding and the significant magnitude of financial
amplification. The second component, which is unique to maturity structure choice,
is determined by term premium. Therefore, the higher the term premium is, the
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larger the pecuniary externality, the greater relative repayment cost undervaluation
of short-term liabilities by private agents.
Intuitively, high term premium means large drop in the future value of long-term
liability, equivalently, large decrease in effective repayment by swapping to long-term
borrowing. Ultimately, the spared resource is able to remarkably improve future bad
states through collateral price and borrowing limit feedback loop, i.e. large pecuniary
externality. As shown in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), term premium is
positive on average and decreases in crises, hence, the pecuniary externality resembles
the dynamics. In terms of inefficiency of maturity choice, this means that there is
more cost undervalue of short-term liabilities on average, and that the undervalue is
most severe in crises. To counteract the inefficiency, capital control tightening should
emphasize short-term inflow, especially in crises.
Figure 1.11: Optimal Long-term Capital Control Without Term Premium
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Note: This plot presents the dynamics of short-/long-term debt taxes in financial crisis episode in a
counterfactual case with term premium half as the original calibration.
To quantify the role of term premium in generating higher optimal short-term cap-
ital control tax than the long-term, I simulate the model with small term premium17
17To generate counterfactual small term premium, I keep the short-term rate unchanged and reduce
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and plot the new optimal long-term capital control tax in Figure 1.11. With small
term premium, the optimal long-term capital control tax is very similar to that on the
short-term. Taking to the extreme, if term premium is negative instead of positive,
applying the same logic, the pattern of short- and long-term capital controls will be
overturned which will feature long-term inflow targeting instead of short-term.
Besides the role in the undervaluation of insurance benefit, another important
function of term premium is to generate interior solution of optimal maturity structure.
To see this, consider zero term premium case, which can be viewed as the debt price
generated by a risk-neutral international creditor, i.e. Mt+1 = M, term premium will
be nil.









= qSt Et(1+ δq
L
t+1)
=⇒ tpt = 0
Proposition 2. Without term premium, the competitive equilibrium yields a corner solution
with borrowing up to bind collateral constraint in terms of long-term debt.
Recall that private agents in the small open economy is risk-averse, therefore, they
value the fact that long-term debt provides insurance against averse shocks tomorrow.
However, the risk-neutral investors do not assign positive value to this, hence, they
are indifferent between whether the same amount of repayment is returned in good
state or bad. As a result, the risk-neutral international investors take all the risk and
provide insurance for the borrowers, resulting in borrowing exclusively in long-term
debt contract. (See Appendix for detailed proof).
the term premium by half.
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1.5.5 Debt Portfolio In Competitive Equilibrium and Ramsey
Equilibrium
As shown in Section 1.4.C, Ramsey equilibrium has fewer crises and less severe crises,
and one important difference between the two is the external borrowing decision. In
Ramsey equilibrium, total borrowing falls less than that in competitive equilibrium,
and the share of short-term debt is much smaller. This section aims to provide more
information on the comparison on the debt portfolio between the two types of equi-
libria, going beyond the crisis episodes.
Total Debt – Social planner and private agents differ in their calculation of the ex-
pected future repayment cost, and this difference will be factored into the optimal
total borrowing and result in different debt volume. To analyze the choice of debt
volume in competitive equilibrium and Ramsey equilibrium, I compare the total
debt’s ergodic distribution in the two equilibria. Since social planner internalizes the
financial amplification effect of future repayment cost through the feedback loop of
consumption decrease, collateral price fall, and borrowing capacity contract, social
planner restrains from over consume today and takes a less indebted position than
private agent.
To demonstrate the correction of over-borrowing by optimal capital controls,
Figure 1.12 (left panel) plots the ergodic distribution of total debt accumulation in
Ramsey economy and competitive economy, respectively. The pattern implies that
the competitive economy assign higher probability to holding large amount of debt.
The average total debt stock in competitive economy (0.89) is significantly higher
than the Ramsey economy counterpart (0.79).
Debt Maturity – Another important aspect of debt policy is the maturity choice.
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Figure 1.12: Ergodic Distribution of Total Debt and Maturity
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Note: This plot shows the ergodic distribution of total debt and short-term debt share, respectively.
The competitive equilibrium is shown in solid line, and the Ramsey equilibrium is the dashed line.
As discussed in Section 1.5.D, the optimal maturity structure is pinned down by the
trade-off between the insurance benefit of long-term debt versus the cost benefit of
short-term debt, and that the presence of pecuniary externality affects the calcula-
tion of long-term debt’s insurance benefit. Although both private agents and social
planner acknowledge that issuing long-term debt today helps to transfer funds to
tomorrow’s bad states, social planner values the transfer even more by internalizing
its influence on easing collateral constraint in tomorrow’s bad states. Therefore, social
planner selects a portfolio with longer maturity than private agent.
Figure 1.12 confirms that optimal portfolio in Ramsey economy tilts towards
long-term debt than the short-term. On average, competitive equilibrium holds a
portfolio constituted by 23.2% of short-term debt, while Ramsey equilibrium only
assigns 13.2%.
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Figure 1.13: Welfare Gains from Optimal Capital Controls



















Note: This chart plots the welfare gain of optimal capital controls measured by ω. Each curve is
evaluated at a fixed level of current long-term debt stock, averaged across exogenous states, and with
varying current short-term debt holding.
1.5.6 Welfare Analysis
Welfare Gain – Given that the optimal capital controls substantially correct over-
borrowing and short-term debt overtaking, this part tends to quantify how much
does the economy benefit from these regulations. To do so, I apply the same method of
Bianchi (2011a) to define the welfare gain as the proportional increase in consumption
for all states in the competitive equilibrium that would make private agents indifferent
between remaining in the competitive equilibrium and the Ramsey equilibrium.





)1−σV(dSt , dLt , St) = V˜(dSt , dLt , St) (1.16)
where V(·) is the value function in competitive equilibrium and V˜(·) is that in Ramsey
equilibrium. The level of ω indicates the magnitude of increase in welfare generated
by optimal capital controls.
Figure 1.13 presents the distribution of welfare gain with respect to current debt
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levels. First, for the majority cases, optimal capital control policies improves welfare
as expected, no matter starting with low liability or high debt burden. Second, the
magnitude of welfare improvement is positively correlated with the level of debt.
Intuitively, with high level of debt, the economy is vulnerable to future adverse
shocks and results in crisis. In these states, the optimal capital controls has the largest
correction effect in constraining over-borrowing and preventing crisis. Thirdly, as has
been shown that crises periods require higher capital control tax rates, a suboptimal
constant tax rate must lie between the lower level in tranquil times and the higher
level in crises times. As a result, the high tax rate may discourage consumption and
borrowing in states with favorable borrowing conditions. For instance, in Figure 1.13,
with low liabilities, meaning decent financial outstanding, welfare gain is slightly
negative. All the states taken together, the optimal capital controls raise welfare
equivalent to 0.59% increase in consumption on average.
The previous sections have established that the Ramsey equilibrium can be sup-
ported by a set of state-contingent and maturity-dependent capital controls in the
competitive equilibrium, and that the optimal capital controls significantly improve
welfare. Given the significant welfare enhancement of optimal policies, this section
analyzes the welfare effect under sub-optimal policies, i.e. state-independent or
maturity-independent. To do so, I consider the same environment as the benchmark
but limit social planner to be able to use only fixed-rate capital control taxes. In partic-
ular, I consider four cases: i) fixed taxes but maturity-dependent (τSt = τ
S, τLt = τ
L), ii)
fixed tax and maturity-independent (τSt = τ
L
t = τ), iii) only fixed tax on short-term in-
flow (τSt = τ
S, τLt = 0), and iv) only fixed tax on long-term inflow (τ
S




In general, these cases tend to provide insights on policy implementations when reg-
ulations are challenging to implement in practice, in particular, the last two are also
18Ideally, another case with state-contingent but maturity-independent taxes should be considered,
however, the solution of constrained optimal taxes is difficult given the large number of states.
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set to gauge the relative importance of short- and long-term inflow capital controls.
Without state-dependent capital control taxes, the decentralization of Ramsey
equilibrium is no longer feasible. Consequently, social planner now solves for the
optimal level of fixed capital control tax to maximize household’s expected life-
time utility with the post-tax borrowing rates. Since the state-contingent optimal
capital controls is procyclical, if set equally, social planner trades off between the
benefit of high tax rate in preventing crisis and the corresponding cost in depressing
consumption in normal time.
Definition 5. (Constrained Social Planner’s Optimization Problem) Social planner chooses
τ to maximize the value function resulted from the competitive equilibrium accordingly to
Definition 1 under the post-tax effective borrowing rates.
Table 1.4 presents the welfare effect of different types of capital controls compared
to the unregulated competitive benchmark. The first observation is that the optimal
capital control tax, even set fixed, is able to insure the economy against adverse
shocks, reduce crisis frequency, and improve welfare on average. For instance, the
maturity-dependent fixed taxes are able to achieve 59% of the welfare improvement
under optimal capital controls, and even the least effective one, fixed tax on long-term
inflow, generates positive welfare improvement. This result is reasonable given that
in the model, pecuniary externality calls for positive tax rate even in normal time.
Second, state-contingency contributes a significant part of welfare improvement.
From the optimal case to state-independent case i), the welfare gain drops by 40%.
However, from the maturity-dependent case i) to maturity-independent case ii), the
welfare gain drops by a smaller extent, 13%.
Regarding the individual effectiveness of short-term inflow control and long-term
inflow control, if restricted with one type of fixed tax, the economy will benefit more
from a fixed short-term capital control tax. The flat short-term capital control tax is
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able to achieve about 32% the welfare improvement in optimal state-contingent and
maturity-dependent regulations, while the welfare gain under optimal long-term
fixed tax is about 3.4% of Ramsey. It is intuitive to see short-term capital control is
superior to the long-term because the overborrowing in competitive equilibrium is
more severe in short-term debt than the long-term. In other words, given the amount
of over-borrowing, short-term borrowing should be more tightly regulated.
Table 1.4: Welfare Effect of Constrained Optimal Capital Controls

















crisis frequency 11.8 13.3 15.3 16.7 19.2 26.3
welfare gain – 0.02% 0.19% 0.23% 0.35% 0.59%
τS – – 1.83% 1.52% 2.09% 2.79%
τL – 0.65% – 1.52% 0.98% 1.71%
Note: This table reports the welfare improvement by different types of capital control taxes. Crisis
frequency is measured in year, and welfare gain is defined as ω in (1.16) and the mean of ω is reported.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies debt portfolio in external borrowing and optimal capital control
policies with financial friction. Empirically, I construct a new measure on changes in
capital control policies and document two novel stylized facts about capital inflow
controls in financial crises: tightening in crises and short-term inflow targeting. To
rationalize the empirical patterns, this paper builds a small open economy model with
multiple maturity debt, collateral constraint, and risk-averse international creditors.
The model highlights the impact pecuniary externality introduced by collateral con-
straint in generating inefficient debt portfolio in competitive equilibrium and derives
a set of state-contingent and maturity-dependent capital controls for reattaining social
optimal debt portfolio.
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In the model, private agents balance between the benefit of borrowing and the
cost of debt repayment to determine optimal external borrowing. In the meantime,
they select the optimal maturity structure by considering the trade-off between the
insurance benefit of long-term debt in hedging against the future adverse shocks and
the cost benefit of issuing short-term debt. However, with the presence of collateral
constraint, private agents fail to internalize the feedback loop between collateral
price and borrowing limit and undervalue the repayment cost of financial liabilities.
Specifically, the cost undervaluation is especially severe for short-term liabilities
due to its high repayment relative to long-term debt in constrained states. As a
result, the competitive equilibrium exhibits overborrowing and excess short-term
debt compared to the social optimal. To fully offset the inefficiencies, capital controls
on short- and long-term inflows should tighten in crisis due to the high probability of
continuing crisis, and short-term inflow should be tightened by a larger extent due
to the positive term premium, especially in crisis. Implemented optimally, capital
controls can substantially improve welfare, reducing the crisis frequency by half and
alleviating the crisis severity.
Overall, the paper’s main innovation has been to study the effect of financial fric-
tion on maturity choice and the optimal policy in correcting the pecuniary externality.
There are other dimensions in which the model can be extended. First, the model now
concentrates on external borrowing and its corresponding optimal regulating policy.
However, as shown by Broner et al. (2013a), large inflow tends to be accompanied
by large outflow, and capital inflow and outflow tightening is highly likely to be
implemented simultaneously (Fernández et al. (2015a)). Therefore, it would be of
great interest to incorporate capital outflow decisions in the small open economy
and to analyze its interaction with financial frictions. Second, in deriving optimal
capital control policies, I assume that social planner has the ability to commit to policy.
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This might change under different forms of collateral such as asset. To examine the
Markov perfect equilibrium with external borrowing at different maturities would be
an important complement to the study in this paper.
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Chapter 2
Capital Controls in Financial Crises: An Empirical Analysis
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2.1 Introduction
When a flow becomes a flood: among the financial crises of the recent decades, in
more and more cases, cross-border capital flows are spotted as one of the primary
contributing factors. For instance, the massive capital flow reverse in Asian crisis
(1997), the vast capital flight in Peso crisis (1994), and the unprecedented capital inflow
prior to Iceland financial crisis (2008) among many others, are shown to drastically
deteriorate the financial system and ignite financial crisis. In consequence, there
has been a reevaluation of the role of controlling cross-border capital flows, and a
growing literature has emerged in support of capital controls as prudential measures
in neutralizing pecuniary externality, counteracting excess economy fluctuation and
taming the global financial cycle.1
Against this backdrop, there has not been much work analyzing the capital control
implementation in practice during financial crisis. To what extent do capital controls
respond to financial crisis? Do they react in a procyclical way or countercyclical? Are
the controls imposed universally or differentiatedly by the characteristics of the flows?
Besides managing the level of flows, is there any composition-adjusting mandate in
capital control policies?
To address these questions, I construct a measure on the stringency of capital
control employing the information on capital control policy changes for 139 financial
crises periods. Utilizing the large variation captured in the capital control stringency
measure based on its changes, I investigate the dynamics of capital control policy in
financial crisis. In the first step, I examine the cyclicality of capital controls to see how
capital control policy responds to economic fluctuations in financial crisis. To this end,
I investigate the incidence of capital control tightening with respect to different stages
of financial crisis: the run-up, the onset, and the spread. The results extend substantial
1See for instance, Korinek (2010), Bianchi (2011b), Benigno et al. (2016b).
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evidence for the procyclicality of capital control tightening as the changes are largely
muted until financial crisis hits the economy and that the extent of tightening peaks
at the start of financial crisis. This strong procyclicality is firmly grounded by the
remarkable increase in the proportion of crises with capital control enhancing and
the significant rise in the average number of new capital control tightening policies
during financial crisis, regardless of the potential offsetting effect from the possible
companion capital control easing policies.
After establishing the procyclicality of capital control tightening at the aggregate
level, I further the examination into controls differentiating the direction of flows. The
same set of analysis as the case of aggregate capital control changes yields the result
that not only outflow controls but also inflow controls share the procyclicality with the
overall capital control. The time series of inflow control changes and outflow control
changes present a virtually identical pattern: changes do not shown up in the run-up
of financial crisis but jump at the beginning of crisis and fade out rapidly. Moreover,
the positive within-country correlation between inflow and outflow control changes
confirms that countries strengthen both inflow and outflow controls simultaneously
during financial crisis. This dual tightening feature is consistent with the strong
comovement between capital inflow and outflow controls documented in Fernández
et al. (2015b).
Besides differentiating controls with respect to different direction of flows, I also
analyze how capital controls change regarding different types of transactions (or
flows). Applying the standard categorization, I divide the transactions into three
groups: FDI, credit transaction, capital market instrument/money market instrument
and financial derivatives. By looking into the inflow and outflow control changes
within each category, I find drastic heterogeneity. On one hand, inflow control
tightening is exclusively imposed on credit transaction. On the other, outflow control
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tightening is applied generally to a wide range of transactions. Although the countries
in the financial crisis sample vary from each other in multiple aspects, these patterns
are robust to different income levels, external indebtedness, exchange rate regimes,
and capital control levels.
The heterogeneity of capital controls tightening with respect to different transac-
tion reveals a novel characteristic of the dynamics of capital control policy in practice,
yet it arouses the question that what is the underlying contributing factor. To an-
swer this question, I propose an examination into the maturity-related sentiment
of capital control policies. By extracting the implied maturity target in the policy
narratives, I trace how much attention that capital control policies lay on the maturity
of flows across different stages in financial crisis. The obtained maturity intensity of
capital control changes shows a significant asymmetry between capital inflow and
outflow tightening. One aspect of the asymmetry is that inflow control tightening
largely increases its emphasis on the maturity of the target transactions once financial
crisis bursts, while outflow control tightening becomes much more general in its
targeted maturity. Beyond its particular attention on flow’s maturity, the inflow
control tightening also pinpoints short-term maturity flows. Putting together, the
asymmetry on maturity targeting in response to the start of financial crisis indicates
to the difference between the mandates of inflow and outflow controls and the ways
of their implementation.
This paper is closely related to three strands of literature. From a methodological
angle, this paper newly constructs a capital control measure and provides new
perspectives to quantify its variation. As such, this paper relates to the literature
on developing measures of capital control, financial openness and integration. The
majority of existing capital control measures are de jure measures based on the Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions (AREAER) published by IMF
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which profiles each member country’s policy regarding exchange rate and trade.
Generally speaking, there are three types of de jure capital control measures. The first
type, pioneered by Epstein and Schor (1989), is based on the binary-type information
of whether a certain type of transaction is coded as constrained or not in the AREAER.
The most widely used one in this category is the Chinn-Ito financial openness index
which is the first principle component of four binary measures corresponding to four
different transactions. The second type makes use of the narratives of the constraint’s
specifics in the updated version of AREAER after 1995. For instance, Quinn (1997)
defines a fine coding from zero to four to measure the intensity of capital controls,
and Schindler (2009) and Fernández et al. (2016a) take another route with defining a
fine categorization of capital transactions to develop a comprehensive set of capital
control measurements. The third type, which is also the less developed one, is not
based on the code or the text about the "level" of exchange rate and trade management
but the "changes" (new capital control policies) documented in the AREAER. Less
development has been made along this dimension, few exceptions include Kastner
and Rector (2003) who extract the changes for 19 OECD countries from 1951 to 1998
and Pasricha et al. (2015) who construct a sample of 17 emerging countries from 2001
to 2011.
The capital control measure in this paper belongs to the third type and makes
contribution in two aspects. First and most importantly, it quantifies the maturity
sentiments of the capital control policy changes on top of the types and directions
of flows which have been explored by Pasricha et al. (2015). Secondly, it extends
the measure to all the financial crisis periods which dated back to 1970s with 114
countries. Also, the newly constructed measure is well suited for the analysis on the
dynamics of capital control changes because it is able to capture a significantly larger
amount of variations than the level-based measures.
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This paper also shares the same theme as a growing literature on investigating
the dynamics of capital controls along business cycle. For instance, Fernández et al.
(2015b) find little evidence that capital controls in practice have been imposed coun-
tercyclically and they demonstrate the lack of cyclicality is robust to various country
heterogeneities. Na et al. (2014b) zoom into sovereign default periods and find
capital controls do not show any remarkable change until default, which indicates
procyclicality. This paper focuses on a different type of periods – financial crises,
and document not only the procyclicality of capital controls but also the maturity
targeting feature and dynamics of capital controls associated with different types and
directions of flows.
As mentioned before, this paper can also be seen as searching evidence from policy
implementation in practice for underpinning or complementing the theoretical litera-
ture on optimal capital controls. Within this literature, some works generally advocate
the usage of capital control policy, and the key rationale is that in an environment
with collateral constraint on external borrowing capital control is useful in adjusting
the pecuniary externality from agents failing to consider the impact from individual
borrowing on price in their borrowing decisions (see Korinek (2010) and Bianchi
(2011b) among many others). Fewer works have devoted to the optimal cyclicality
of capital controls. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) shows that standard collateral
constraint models a là Bianchi (2011b) predict increases in capital controls when
the crisis hits. However, in models with downward nominal wage rigidity, optimal
capital controls should increase during booms and are relaxed during contractions
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016)). This paper sheds new light on the discussion of
optimal capital control policy by documenting the procyclicality of policy implemen-
tation in financial crisis and also the maturity-adjusting intention of capital control
policies beyond the level-managing motive emphasized in the literature.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction
and the evaluation of the capital control measure using the changes documented
in AREAER. Section 3 lays out the economy fluctuations in a typical financial crisis.
Section 4 begins the investigation of the cyclicality of capital controls in financial crisis.
Section 5 explores the capital controls with respect to different types and directions
of flows. Section 6 highlights the maturity targeting of capital controls. Section 7
concludes the empirical findings and proposes a theoretical rationale and future
extensions.
2.2 The Data
The data used in the analysis is a newly constructed capital control stringency measure
based on the AREAER. This new dataset contains a set of capital control measures on
a five-year window, spanning from two years before the crisis to two years after the
start of the crisis, for the financial crises identified by Laeven and Valencia (2013). In
total, it covers 139 financial crises and 114 countries from 1970 to 2012.
To quantify the stringency of capital control, I employ the information from the
"Changes" section from the AREAER. In each year, the AREAER publishes a report
on member country’s policy regarding various sorts of exchange rate management,
payment and proceeds arrangement, capital transaction and other transactions. For
instance, whether there is a restriction or not and what specifics are in the restric-
tion. In every country’s profile, after the detailed description of arrangements and
restrictions by transaction type, there is a "Changes" section detailing all the policy
changes in the previous year. It is constituted by a list of policy narratives categorized
by the general types of transactions in a chronological manner. For instance, on
November 28th 2008, Iceland initiated a new regulation on credit transaction within
capital transaction category: "Lending to or borrowing from nonresidents is allowed
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only for loans with a maturity of at least one year and in an amount not exceeding
ISK 10 million a person a calendar year." To fully utilize the information of policy
narratives, I construct multiple measures of capital control based the types of the
targeted flow (FDI, credit transaction, capital market instrument/money market
instrument/financial derivatives2), the direction of the flow (into the country vs. out
from the country), and the intention of the policy (tightening vs. easing). Therefore,
each policy is examined at these three dimensions. For instance, the previously men-
tioned new policy carried out in Iceland on November 28th 2008 is labeled as both
"inflow tightening on credit transaction" and "outflow tightening on credit transac-
tion". Combining all the information within the policies, I obtain the capital control
stringency measures as the numbers of inflow/outflow tightening/easing policies
with respect to FDI, credit transaction and capital market instrument/money market
instrument/financial derivatives for each year in the financial crisis window.
Table 2.1 presents the number of policies in each category, and the general pattern
shows two features of the capital control changes in financial crisis. First, more
policies are imposed on capital inflow than outflow, especially the easing policy.
This is related to the overall global financial integration trend during the last a few
decades that countries intend to remove the barriers of cross-border capital inflows
and benefit the domestic economy with more sources of external financing. Second,
most policy attention is laid on credit transaction among the three types of transaction,
especially regarding the tightening stance. The exclusively large policy attention on
credit transaction will be further investigated in the later section, especially on its
cyclicality and maturity targeting.
2In principle, there could be more detailed break-down of the transaction according to transaction
types. However, prior to 1983, AREAER only list the policies without categorizing them into groups.
To minimize the mismatch due to changes in transaction definition, I group the policies at a less
detailed level. Also, capital market instrument, money market instrument and financial derivatives
are grouped together to make them quantitatively comparable to the other two. The definition of asset
categories is based on the Compilation Guide in the AREAER, more details in the Appendix.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Inflow Inflow Outflow Outflow
Tightening Easing Tightening Easing
FDI 1 50 7 14
cap_mm_dev 5 90 24 62
credit 111 134 67 34
Total 117 274 98 110
Obs. 695 695 695 695
Note: This table reports the number of capital control changes with respect
to different types of transactions or flows and different direction of flows.
The first two columns are inflow, and the last two are outflow. The types of
transactions that listed here are: FDI (the first row), capital market instru-
ment/money market instrument and financial derivatives (the second row)
and credit transaction (the third row).
As discussed before, this newly constructed capital control measure aligns with the
body of literature quantifying capital controls, however, it has two unique advantages
compared to the existing capital control indexes. The first advantage is that it provides
a way to investigate the changes in capital control at intensive margin besides the
existing extensive margin measures. In other words, it helps us to understand
how much less/more stricter the controls become in the cases other than a 100%
liberalization or close-up. The second advantage is that it allows to identify the
capital control policy changes with specific maturity target by extracting the maturity
sentiments from the detailed policy narratives.
It is well accepted that capital control is path dependent, which means it might
take years for countries to fully liberalize or to completely withdraw itself from the
global financial market. As a result, the extensive measure is well designed to capture
major changes in capital flow management but not the small changes. There are three
approaches to improve the extensive measure. The first one is to assign different
values each restriction to reflect it intensity. For instance, Quinn (1997) and Quinn et al.
(2011a) develop a finer coding on a range of zero to four for capital account openness.
The second method is to look into a list of detailed types of capital transactions
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and aggregate up the overall extensive measure from multiple transaction-specific
extensive measures (applied in Schindler (2009), Fernández et al. (2016a)). The two
approaches both succeed in restoring more variations than an overall measure at the
aggregate level. The last one, which is the one applied in Kastner and Rector (2003),
Pasricha et al. (2015)3 and also here, is to delve directly into the information in the
policies who are particularly carried out to modify the extent to which the capital
transactions are managed. In order to see which method yields more improvement,
I compare the three measures among the overlapping years and countries. The top
panel of Table 2.2 reports the comparisons among the stringency measure ("Change")
and Quinn et al. (2011a). Since Quinn’s index does not distinguish inflow and outflow,
only the proportion with capital control level different from the previous year is listed.
It can be drawn that the stringency measure captures more variations, especially in
capital control easing, as the proportion is five times higher. The bottom panel lists
the result on the "changes" measure versus Fernández et al. (2016a), and it shows that
the stringency measure picks up at least one time more changes.
Table 2.2: Comparison Among Capital Control Measures
Tightening Easing Tightening Easing Tightening Easing
Inflow Inflow Outflow Outflow Overall Overall
Number of changes
New measure 30 65 27 35
Quinn (2011) 39 15
Observation 333 333 333 333 333 333
Number of changes
New measure 68 93 61 51
Fernandez et al. (2016) 24 24 22 22
Observation 217 217 217 217
Note: This table reports the comparison between the newly-constructed measure of capital control
changes and the existing measures. The top panel is between the new measure and Quinn et al.
(2011b), and the bottom panel is between the new measure and Fernández et al. (2016b) index. The
sample is the overlapping country-year pair between datasets.
3Kastner and Rector (2003) extract the changes for 19 OECD countries from 1951 to 1998. Pasricha
et al. (2015) did it for 17 emerging countries from 2001 to 2011.
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Besides picking up more variations, the "changes" measure also provides a new
perspective – maturity targeting for examining capital controls. Although policies
generally referring different types of capital transactions abound, for instance, "A new
foreign investment law was adopted, which simplified administrative procedures
for the establishment and taxation of new joint ventures" (Poland, July 4th 1991) for
FDI, and "The acquisition of stocks in resident credit institutions by nonresidents no
longer required CBR approval" (Russia, Dec. 29th 2006) for equity transaction, there
is a significant portion of policies particularly targeting maturities. For instance, "The
minimum mandatory reserve requirement was increased to 30% for deposits in local
currency with maturity of less than 30 days, ... and the minimum mandatory reserve
requirement for foreign currency deposits was reduced to 4% from 10% for maturities
more than 180 days." (Uruguay, Sept. 2nd, 2002), which indicates the mandate to curb
short-term transaction but promote long-term transaction4. This type of information
provides a new angle to investigate the maturity target of capital control policy and
assess its role in adjusting the composition of the cross-border capital flows besides
the level.
In sum, this newly constructed data shares the merits of the existing measures
which distinguish the controls with respect to different directions of and types of
capital flows. Furthermore, it fits better for the purpose of analyzing the capital
control changes in financial crisis because of its fine measure in the stringency of
capital controls, precise information on the maturity target and its full coverage of
the financial crisis periods.
4More information can be found in Appendix about extracting the maturity target.
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2.3 Economy Fluctuations in Financial Crises
Before delving into the dynamics of capital control changes in financial crisis, it might
be useful to lay out the context of financial crisis per se. Laeven and Valencia (2013)
define financial crisis as the periods with “significant signs of financial distress in the
banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system,
and/or bank liquidations)” and “significant banking policy intervention measures in
response to significant losses in the banking system”. Within the 139 financial crises,
there are 28 in advanced countries, 61 in emerging countries and 50 in developing
countries. A typical example of financial crisis in advanced countries is the 2007 crisis
in the U.S., and a typical example for emerging and developing countries is the 1997
Asian crisis.
To see the financial stress and output loss in financial crisis, in the left-hand chart
of Figure 2.1, I plot the output gap and credit-to-gdp ratio gap (the cyclical component
of credit-to-gdp ratio) in a five-year window around the starting year of financial
crisis5. Compared to pre-crisis, there is over 5% output loss in after two years of the
onset of financial crisis and accumulatively 10% output loss over the crisis period.
On the credit side, in the run-up of crisis, there is a rapid growth in private credit,
however, the credit boom is drastically cooled down once the crisis hits. Two years
after the start of financial crisis, the credit-to-gdp ratio is 4% lower than the highest
level.
5Output gap is calculated as the cyclical component of the logarithm of real GDP with quadratic
detrending, and credit-to-gdp ratio gap is calculated as the cyclical component of its level with
quadratic detrending. Both real GDP and Domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP are from WDI
dataset of the World Bank.
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Similar to the financial system and domestic output, country’s stances on external
accounts in the financial crisis vastly deteriorates as well. The right-hand chart of
Figure 2.1 presents the magnitude of capital inflow, outflow and current account
relative to GDP. It shows that cross-border capital flows collapse by more than 10%
when the financial crisis starts and that it stays subdued for more than one year
after the burst of crisis. In the meantime, although quite transitory, current account
worsens upon the arrival of financial crisis. In Laeven and Valencia (2013), they also
document the companioning increase in debt, deficit in fiscal budget and peak in
nonperforming loans in financial crisis.
2.4 The Cyclicality of Capital Control in Financial
Crises
To examine the cyclicality of capital control around the Financial crisis, I focus on
the capital control changes in a five-year window with two years before and after
the start of financial crisis. The analysis conveys two stylized patterns: first, capital
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control shows strong procyclicality as no significant changes happen until the start
of financial crisis (procyclicality); second, not only outflow but also inflow are more
constrained once financial crisis begins (dual tightening).
Figure 2.2 presents a panel of charts that characterize the procyclicality and the dual
tightening features of capital control cyclicality. The first chart in the top panel shows
the proportion of crises with capital control tightening at each point in the five-year
financial crisis window. Taking two years prior to the crisis as the initial state, we can
observe that about 3% of the 139 financial crisis periods experience capital control
tightening, and the proportion remains relative stable one year after. However, when
financial crisis hits the economy, there is a remarkable spike in both the inflow control
and outflow control as 12% countries impose tighter constraints on inflow and the
share goes even further to 15% for outflow. As fast as its increase, the tightening fades
out rapidly and it falls down to the pre-crisis level after two years.
Besides the proportion of the crises with capital control tightening, an alternative
measure of capital control tightening is the average number of tightening policies
at each time point. Unlike the proportion measure which represents how likely
capital control is tightened in a financial crisis window, the average number of policy
provides information about to what extent additional capital flow constraints are
employed. The second chart of the top panel in Figure 2.2 shows the result, from
which we can observe a strong comovement of the inflow control and outflow control
and that both of them show a similar inverse-V shape to the proportion measure.
Starting from two-year before crisis, the average number of capital control tightening
is about 0.1, which means on average about one capital control tightening happens
for every ten countries. In the run-up of crisis, there is still no significant tightening.
However, upon the arrival of financial crisis, the average number of tightening
policies jumps to one per three countries. After the start of the financial crisis, the
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tightening shifts to a declining trend and goes back to the initial level in two years.
The results of proportion and average number based on capital control tightening
provide strong evidence for procyclicality and the dual tightening, but there could be
simultaneous capital control easing offsetting the tightening. To address this concern,
I construct the net average number of capital control tightening policies by subtracting
the number of capital control easing out from tightening to check whether the patterns
still stand. The first chart in the bottom panel of Figure 2.2 presents the result. It is
true that the easing policies carried out at the same time as tightening cancel out a
small amount of tightening policies, yet the net average numbers of policies of both
inflow and outflow maintain the procyclicality. This also indicates that capital control
easing in the financial crisis is not as procyclical as tightening, otherwise, it will be
able to neutralize or even overturn the procyclicality of tightening.
The net measure of capital control tightening has the merit of taking the easing
counterpart into consideration, yet an implicit assumption in the measure construc-
tion is that one tightening policy can be fully offset by one easing policy. This suffers
from the potential shortcoming of neglecting the heterogeneity among policies. For
instance, in 2007, during the financial crisis, Slovenia passed the regulation of credit
inflow easing "The required reserve ratios for deposits in foreign currency and in
euros were unified at 2% for deposits with a maturity up to two years and zero for
longer maturities." which indicates a credit inflow easing (for the longer maturities),
while in the same year there was a capital and money market instrument regulation
stating that "the issuance of capital and money market instruments by residents in the
EU and nonresidents in Slovenia became subject to authorization.". In the previous
net capital control tightening measure, these two policies are equally weighted (the
same as the majority of existing capital control measures) which leads to a net value
of zero. However, the two policies target different types of flows, and the magnitude
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of them may be too different to make the impact of the two policies comparable. One
possible adjustment is to use the lagged value of type-specific flows as weight to each
capital control policy, and its idea is to proxy the impact of the policy by the pre-policy
level of the target flow. Although imperfect, as the target flow reflects only one aspect
of the intensity of the capital control policy, it would still provide some sense of the
evolution of capital control if the intensity of each policy is partially addressed. The
last chart in Figure 2.2 plots the time series of the weighted net average number of
capital control tightening6. Although the pattern is nosier than the previous three, it
still generates that capital control inflow and outflow are significantly tightened when
the financial crisis hits the economy. There is certain amount of ongoing fluctuation
after the beginning of financial crisis, but none of them is significant.
6The historical inflow and outflow data with respect to different flows is from BOP dataset
(IMF). The flow associated with "capital market instrument/money market instrument/financial
derivatives" is the sum of portfolio investment and financial derivatives. The credit transaction flow is
the subcategory of deposit and loan to commercial banks within the other flows category. Because
the break-down of "other flows" is very patchy, the data only allows constructing the weight-adjusted
measure for 41 financial crisis periods after 1988.
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Weighted Net Average Number of Capital Control Tightening
One additional evidence for the dual tightening on inflow and outflow is the within-
country correlation of the inflow and outflow capital control tightening measures.
This measure complements the aggregate time series in Figure 2.2 by examining
whether the country implementing capital control tightening is the same one carrying
out capital control easing or not. If the countries imposing capital inflow tightening
are a different set from those hurdling capital outflow, then the close comovement
shown in Figure 2.2 between inflow and outflow control tightening can not be inter-
preted as dual tightening but country heterogeneity. Figure 2.3 is devoted to addressing
this issue by plotting the density function of the within-country correlation between
capital inflow control tightening and its outflow counterpart. As the distribution of
the correlation shows, the majority of them is positive, which confirms that those
who tighten outflow control are indeed strengthening inflow control simultaneously.
This dual tightening is also consistent with the strong positive correlation between the
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outflow and inflow capital control indexes documented in Fernández et al. (2015b)
on a larger panel of countries and years.








Overall, this section analyzes the aggregate capital control changes along the
financial crisis window, and it demonstrates that capital control responds to the crisis
in unique ways as capital control is tightened procyclically and more restrictions are
imposed on the cross-border flows in both directions.
2.5 Capital Control On Different Types of Transactions
in Financial Crises
After exploring the aggregate capital control changes, this section delves deeper
into the changes with respect to various types of target flows. The purpose is to
see whether the aggregate cyclicality holds for all transactions or it is driven by
handful ones, and it intends to shed new light on the potential policy intention on
the structure-managing of capital flows beyond the total volume.
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Figure 2.4 presents evidence of a strong asymmetry between inflow and outflow
capital control changes with flows break-down. On one hand, the inflow control pol-
icy exclusively focuses on credit transaction with barely any changes on the rest two;
on the other, the outflow control policy is applied to a broader range of transactions
including not only credit transaction but also capital market instrument/money mar-
ket instrument/financial derivatives. To provide detailed evidence, in the top panel
of Figure 2.4, I plot the average number of capital inflow control policies with respect
to different types of transactions in both gross and net measure (on the left-hand
side and on the right-hand side, respectively). The charts show remarkably different
patterns between credit transaction and the rest two. The capital control policy on
credit transaction almost triples when the financial crisis hits the economy, while the
policies concerning the other two remain highly stable from the run-up of crisis to the
burst of crisis and to the span of crisis.
However, this sharp contrast among different types of transactions in the inflow
controls is much less prominent in the case of outflow control policies. In the bottom
panel of Figure 2.4, I show the evolution for how the outflow control policies respond
to financial crisis. It can be observed that credit transaction is not the sole center of
policy attention anymore, and control on capital market instrument/money market
instrument/financial derivatives is strengthened as well.
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The sharp contrast among different types of flows and between different directions
of flows is significant yet an average and unconditional pattern across all the countries.
Across the 139 financial crises in the sample, countries remarkably differ from each
other in various aspects. For instance, there are advanced countries such as Iceland
and also low-income countries such as Bangladesh; countries running large external
deficit such as Ukraine and also large surplus countries such as Germany; floating
exchange rate countries such as the U.S. and also peggers such as Kuwait; countries
with extensive capital controls such as China and countries with less friction in capital
movement such as the U.K. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to check whether the
pattern is persistent conditional on country characteristics and to test whether the
lack of policy changes is a result of two opposite changes offsetting each other. To this
end, I will divide the whole sample by income level, external indebtedness, exchange
rate regime, and capital control level to see the capital control changes within in each
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subgroup.
Figure 2.5 shows the average number of capital control changes with break-down
of flows for countries with different income levels based on the categorization from
the World bank. Generally, the dynamics of each group share a similar pattern with
the whole sample counterpart (Figure 2.4), which indicates the difference in income
level does not overturn the overwhelming policy attention on credit transaction and
the more precise type-targeting in inflow control changes. Although the general
dynamics are similar across groups, the medium-income countries change its capital
control in a more significant way than the other two groups. For instance, in the
onset of financial crisis, the average number of credit inflow and outflow controls
reaches almost one tightening per two countries which is the highest among all
country groups, all types of flows, and all periods. A potential explanation could be
that medium-income countries are mostly emerging countries, who suffer the most
from the fickleness of international capital flows, so policy makers tend to take more
actions to minimize the negative impacts.
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Figure 2.6 addresses the concern about the heterogeneity in the external indebted-
ness among countries. As stressed in the literature of sovereign default, the indebt-
edness plays an important role determining country’s risk and how willing external
financial resource is to continuing engaging transaction with the country. Therefore, it
is closely related to the volume of capital flows and the policy reaction regarding them.
In Figure 2.6, I separate the whole sample into high-, medium-, and low-indebtedness
countries based on its net-foreign-asset-to-GDP ratio7, and high (low) indebtedness is
defined as the lowest (top) quintile among all countries in the world (including both
within and outside sample countries) and medium is the rest. It shows that all country
groups resemble the whole sample in the way that how capital control policies are
tightened in financial crisis. Comparing the magnitude of changes across groups, we
can observe that high-indebtedness countries strengthen their inflow control policy
7Date source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
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by the lowest extent among the three, and it could be rationalized in the way that the
inflow is so limited considering the country’s bad stance in sustaining the external
solvency that policy makers are reluctant to further limit the liquidity.






























































































Another important perspective of countries’ heterogeneity is the exchange rate
regime. The toolkit of capital controls may be especially important for the fixed-
exchange-rate countries since they do not have the flexibility in currency appreciation
and depreciation. According to the classical trilemma theory, a fixed-exchange-
rate country could still use monetary policy to well contain the risk from exposing
to large fluctuations in capital flows. However, recent theory has pointed out, in
the circumstance of downward wage rigidity or zero-lower-bound, fixed-exchange-
rate countries may find themselves limited in monetary policy tools and become
more willing to employ capital controls. To investigate whether this is shown in
practice, I divide the countries into peg, crawling peg and floating regimes based
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on Ilzetzki et al. (2011), and the results are presented in Figure 2.7. The first feature
stands out from the chart is that all countries, no matter what foreign exchange rate
regime they adopt, still particularly contain credit inflows in crisis and generally curb
various types of outflows. This supports the robustness of the baseline pattern. The
second observation, which is consistent with the theory, is that peg and crawling peg
countries together indeed employ more capital control tightening policies than the
floating-regime countries, especially on the side of inflow. Therefore, although the
extent to which each country group imposes capital control tightening varies, the
cyclicality and asymmetry across flows are well grounded.
























































































The last type of country differentiation taken here is by its capital control level.
Intuitively, one may expect less capital control tightening from a country with a
considerably large amount of hurdles for the flows of capital. To distinguish countries
with extensive capital controls from those with occasional capital controls, I borrow
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the categorization of "wall" and "gate" countries from Klein (2012). Klein (2012)
defines "wall" countries as those have long-standing controls that cover a broad
range of assets and "gate" countries as those impose episodic controls on a narrower
set of assets. The categorization is based on 44 countries from 1995 to 2010, and it
yields twelve financial crises involving "wall" countries and twenty-five with "gate"
countries in the whole sample. Figure 2.8 reports the results for each group. The
overall cyclicality and difference among flows significantly coincide with those of
the whole sample. Moreover, consistent with the definition of "wall" and "gate", we
observe a larger number of tightening policies in "wall" countries than "gate". For
instance, on the level side, in the onset of financial crisis, on average each "wall"
country implements one tightening policy on credit inflow and outflow, while the
intensity is only half for the "gate" countries. However, on the change side, the results
coincides with the intuition that "wall" countries are left with less room for more
tightening. Considering the changes when the financial crisis starts relative to that
in the pre-crisis era, the number of new tightening polices almost triples for credit
inflow and even five times higher for credit outflow in "gate" countries. Compared
to the intensive changes in the "gate" countries, the "wall" group only doubles the
intensity of pre-crisis.
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2.5.1 Sudden Stop Episodes
Table 2.3 compares the capital control policy changes in the sudden stop8 with those
in the peak and the recovery. The top panel is based on a sample of 33 sudden stop
episodes from Calvo et al. (2006) with at least mild GDP decrease, and the bottom
panel is restricted to a subsample of 22 sudden stop episodes with GDP collapse.
Within each sample, I examine the difference in the percentage of capital control
tightening, the gross number of tightening policies, and the number of tightening
policies net from easing policies.
8Generally, the sudden stop period lasts for more than one year while the peak or the recovery
is labeled as a specific year, so I calculate the maximum of capital control policy changes during the
whole period and compare it with the peak and the recovery.
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The results report significant capital control tightening during the sudden stop
than at the preceding peak. In the first column, I compare the capital control changes
during the sudden stop periods versus the preceding peak. For instance, in the
33-episode sample, there are 21% more countries carrying out new capital control
tightening policies than those in the peak with significance of 6%, and more than one
capital control tightening (net easing) was implemented during the sudden stop than
at the preceding peak with 3% significance.
The third column shows a similar comparison between the sudden stop and the
recovery, and it shows that capital control is also tightened in the sudden stop relative
to the recovery year but the difference is less significant than those compared to the
peak. Particularly, regarding the outflow, the capital control is significantly looser
in the recovery than in the sudden stop, while the inflow control change is more
long-lasting.
To investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the capital control changes among
different types of flows in the sudden stop episodes, I apply the same comparison
conditional on flows. Table 2.4 shows that the credit flow remains the focus of policy,
similar to the financial crisis. However, FDI flow gains policy attention as more
controls are imposed on the remittance of the profit from FDI during the sudden
stop. Also, same as the overall pattern, the strengthening in capital control during the
sudden stop is more prominent compared to the preceding peak than to the recovery.
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Table 2.3: Capital Control Changes: Sudden Stop Versus Peak and Recovery
SS−peak p-value SS−recovery p-value
With GDP Collapse or Mild Decrease (33 episodes)
% of tightening
inflow 0.21 0.06 0.12 0.11
outflow 0.24 0.03 0.42 0.00
number of tightening policy
inflow 0.52 0.09 0.27 0.14
outflow 0.85 0.08 1.27 0.02
number of tightening policy (net easing)
inflow 1.45 0.03 0.27 0.27
outflow 0.88 0.06 1.67 0.02
SS−peak p-value SS−recovery p-value
With GDP Collapse (22 episodes)
% of tightening
inflow 0.32 0.01 0.23 0.05
outflow 0.32 0.02 0.50 0.00
number of tightening policy
inflow 0.82 0.01 0.50 0.06
outflow 1.27 0.08 1.68 0.03
number of tightening policy (net easing)
inflow 2.00 0.02 0.14 0.35
outflow 1.41 0.05 2.27 0.03
Table 2.4: Capital Control Changes by Flow Type: Sudden Stop Versus Peak and
Recovery
SS−peak p-value SS−recovery p-value
Credit
inflow 1.15 0.05 0.12 0.37
outflow 0.58 0.09 1.00 0.02
Capital/Money Market & Financial Derivatives
inflow 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.10
outflow 0.15 0.18 0.52 0.02
FDI
inflow 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.42
outflow 0.21 0.06 0.21 0.06
Despite the heterogeneity in magnitude, all sets of results provide solid evidence
for a robust pattern of the particular policy stress on controlling credit inflow versus
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the general tightening on a wide range of transactions. The pattern holds well across
countries differing in development status and policy stances. It naturally leads to
the question, what contributes to the pattern? Especially, what distinguishes credit
inflow from the others?
One hypothesis would be credit inflow is more volatile than the rest. However, the
argument lacks solid grounds from the literature. For instance, Bluedorn et al. (2013)
use a large panel covering 150 countries with more than three decades to analyze
the dynamics of capital flows, and they find there is little significant difference in
volatility across portfolio and bank-related flows. Eichengreen et al. (2017) construct
a quarterly sample of 34 emerging countries and show that both portfolio debt and
bank-intermediated flows remain the most volatile.
Another hypothesis is that bank is most related to credit transaction among all
cross-border capital flows and that policy may concentrate on credit flows in order to
resolve the issue of financial system who is at the center of financial crisis. However,
although there is a considerable amount of capital control changes regarding the
reserve ratio, the minimal maturity, and transaction tax of banks, there are policies
regulating the overall private borrowing as well. For instance, Iceland carried out new
policy in 2009 to limit the external borrowing in general instead of specific to those
channeled by financial system. Moreover, this hypothesis would indicate that any
cross-border transactions intermediated by banks will be subject to regulation, yet
this is not the case. As will be demonstrated in the next section, the policy attention
on credit transaction does not aim at constraining all bank’s transactions as a whole.
Different from the previous hypotheses, here I propose to a new angle to investi-
gate the asymmetry between inflow and outflow controls: the maturity targeting. The
results (detailed in the next section) show that the asymmetry in target flows is closely
associated with asymmetry in target maturities as short-term inflow is particularly
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constrained while less emphasis on maturity is found on outflow controls.
2.6 The Maturity Targeting of Capital Controls
In order to analyze the maturity targeting of capital control policies, the first step is
to distinguish which policies contain specific maturity target (labeled as "maturity-
related policy"). In the second step, for each of the maturity-related policy, differen-
tiate whether the policy intention is to target short-term flows (or increase average
maturity) or long-term flows (or decrease average maturity)9. Corresponding to
the two measures, there are two perspectives worth looking into for examining the
dynamics of maturity targeting of capital control policies: the proportion of maturity-
related policies relative to the total changes, and the proportion of short-term-targeted
policies relative to total changes. The former tells whether the capital control becomes
more particular or more general in terms of targeting flow’s maturity, and the latter
further pins down what is the targeted maturity if there is one.
Figure 2.9 provides strong evidence for the increasing maturity attention for inflow
control changes in financial crisis and the dominant emphasis on short-term inflow.
The left-hand chart plots the proportion of maturity-related policy to the total number
of policy changes for inflow and outflow tightening, respectively, and we can observe
that the maturity-related policy moves in a completely opposite way between inflow
tightening and outflow tightening. For instance, as the economy approaches the crisis,
there are more and more maturity-related inflow control policies but fewer and fewer
outflow counterpart. When the financial crisis arrives, the maturity-related policy
accounts for about half of the total inflow tightening, which doubles the pre-crisis
level. In the meantime, the maturity-related policy only constitutes 10% of the total
outflow tightening policy, which is less than one quarter of the pre-crisis level. The
9Detailed procedure can be found in Appendix.
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maturity attention is also persistent as it stays around the new level for two years
after the breakout of the financial crisis.
To further distinguish whether short-term or long-term flow attracts more policy
attention, the right-hand chart of Figure 2.9 plots the ratio of the tightening pol-
icy especially constraining short-term flows (or intending to increase the average
maturity) to total for inflow- and outflow-related policy changes, respectively. The
first thing to notice is that the short-term flows do not draw much attention of the
outflow tightening policy changes, and the ratio barely changes along the whole
financial crisis window. On the contrary, the short-term flows are at the core of inflow
tightening policy. From the less than 20% prior to crisis to more than 40% upon the
start of crisis and even higher after the burst of crisis, the tightening policies are more
and more frequently imposed to curb the short-term inflows.
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Combing the results, we can see that although inflow and outflow controls are
both strengthened when the financial crisis starts, the implementation of the policies
is drastically different. On the outflow side, control is tightened extensively on
flows with all lengths of maturity; while on the inflow side, control is enhanced and
pinpointed to the short-term maturity (asymmetric maturity targeting). This stylized
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pattern reveals the composition adjusting beyond the volume controlling of the
capital control policy, and it also provides a rationale for the asymmetry in the flow
targeting illustrated in the last section, indicating the maturity characteristics of
different transactions plays an important role in the policy determination.
2.7 Maturity-dependent Reserve Requirements
Exploring the information from the policy statements provides a meaningful way
to examine the potential maturity-targeting mandate in capital inflow controls, yet
essentially it is an indicator measure on whether the policy constrains short-term
inflow or long-term inflow. In order to provide further insights on the extent to which
the short-term capital inflow is more regulated than the long-term, I use the reserve
requirements on different types of deposit from Federico et al. (2014). There are
two advantages of this measure: first, it is continuous which enables the magnitude
comparison; second, for considerable amount of countries, the reserve requirement is
set based on the currency and the type of deposit which helps to distinguish external
borrowing with respect to different maturities. According to the categorization of
deposit, I associate the reserve requirement on foreign currency term deposit as long-
term external borrowing and that on foreign currency demand deposit as short-term
external borrowing.10
Figure 2.10 shows the dynamics of reserve requirements in the financial crisis
periods. The left panel displays the proportion of financial crises in which reserve
requirement increases. Prior to crisis, there are barely any increase in reserve require-
ments, however, once the crisis materializes, in about 40% of crises, policy makers
10Capital inflow could take the form of domestic currency deposit as well, and likewise foreign
currency deposit could be from domestic fund. Therefore, I check the domestic currency term deposit
and demand deposit reserve requirement for the same countries and same period as foreign currency,
and the domestic currency reserve requirement with respect to different maturity shows a qualitatively
similar pattern with the foreign counterpart.
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Note: This figure shows the reserve requirements on foreign currency deposit with respect to different
maturities. The plot on the left shows the share of financial crises that display increase in reserve
requirement, and the plot on the right presents the levels of reserve requirement on short-/long-term
deposit, respectively. Here, demand deposit represents short-term inflow, and term deposit stands for
long-term inflow.
tighten the inflow of short-term external funds. On the contrary, less than 10% of the
policy makers choose to increase long-term deposit reserve requirement. The right
panel plots the levels of reserve requirement around financial crises. The pattern
shows a significantly large increase in short-term deposit reserve requirement, about
eight percentage points rise compared to the pre-crisis level. However, long-term
deposit only experiences a minor raise in reserve requirement, with a magnitude
about 4%. Taken together, although both reserve requirements are modified upwardly
during crisis, reserve requirement on short-term foreign currency deposit is raised
by a larger amount, which indicates a more substantial control is employed on the
short-term inflow during financial crises.
To summarize, these facts present important patterns in financial crises about the
level and the maturity composition of private external borrowing, and the capital
control policy responses in terms of cyclicality and maturity targeting. The key find-
ings include the plummet in private external borrowing, the increase in short-term
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borrowing, the capital inflow tightening, and the short-term inflow targeting in tight-
ening policies. Based on these observations, the next section introduces a model of
international borrowing with financial friction which is consistent with these stylized
facts: private agent reduces external borrowing and shift to short-term debt during
crisis, and the optimal capital control policy should tighten capital inflows constraints,
particularly for short-term inflows.
2.8 Conclusion
Along with the rapid pace of global financial integration, more and more attention has
been drawn to the cross-border capital flows for its vast volume and high fickleness
which may deteriorate the receiving country’s financial system and trigger financial
crisis. This paper tends to provide empirical analysis on how countries cope with
fluctuations in cross-border capital flows in financial crisis, in particular, when capital
control polices are imposed, what type of capital control policies are employed, and
in what way they are implemented.
To investigate the evolution of capital control policies in financial crisis, I first
construct a novel capital control stringency measure utilizing the policy changes
documented in the AREAER. It complements the existing capital control indexes
by quantifying the changes in the intensity of capital control, which overcomes the
possible missing variation in the measures based on capital control levels. Besides
sharing the merits of differentiating the capital control policies with respect to differ-
ent directions of flows and different types of transactions with the latest development
in quantifying capital controls (e.g. Schindler (2009), Fernández et al. (2016a)), it
further distinguishes different maturities of target flows, which provides a new angle
to examine the capital control policies.
The newly constructed data reveals three stylized facts about capital control
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policies in financial crisis. The first one is procyclicality, which is that capital control
policy barely changes until financial crisis starts and that once financial crisis hits
the economy, the controls are strengthened. The second one is dual tightening, which
shows that both inflow and outflow controls are significantly enhanced upon the
arrival of financial crisis. The third one is asymmetric maturity targeting, which refers
to the distinct pattern between inflow control and outflow control regarding the
maturity of the targeted flows. Inflow control changes substantially differ from its
outflow counterpart as the particularly target short-term flows while controls are
generally tightened regardless of the maturity on the side of outflow.
These stylized facts also bring new perspectives to the theoretical literature. For
instance, the existing papers on optimal capital control policy have primarily focused
on the net flow which naturally yields optimal policy as strengthening control on
inflow (outflow) and easing the other. This is opposite to the strong comovement
of the inflow and outflow controls observed in the data. Also, most attention has
been drawn to curbing the level of capital flow, while the asymmetric maturity targeting
shows the maturity structure is also a critical concern of policy.
In an ongoing work, I propose a model with gross capital flows and different
maturities to jointly rationalize the stylized facts. The mechanism works in the
way that in financial crisis, outflow, no matter in what type, imposes downward
pressure on the real exchange rate, therefore the optimal policies aiming at reducing
the depreciation pressure suppress any possible capital flow leaving the country.
However, for inflow, the maturity of external liability matters. It is because short-term
liability bears rollover risk while that long-term liability helps to alleviate fire-sale and
consequently the rollover risk of short-term liability in financial crisis. The private
agent overlooks the social welfare benefit of long-term liability and over-borrows in
short-term. Therefore, the optimal capital inflow control especially targets short-term
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liability to offset the externality.
So far, I have been focusing on the countries who adjusts capital control policies
in response to financial crisis, however, there is a considerable number of countries
who do not change their cross-border flows management. It would be interesting to
investigate what contributes to this difference. It could be that some countries find
domestic policies such as financial sector regulation is more effective than capital
controls in their cases, or the cost of tightening capital control such as loss of liquidity
is much higher than the benefit, or even the political issue plays an important role in
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3.1 Introduction
The composition of capital flows matters for economic efficiency (for instance, Levchenko
and Mauro (2007), Contessi et al. (2013), Evans and Hnatkovska (2014)) and financial
stability. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of
2008-2009, countries that rely more on external debt exhibit a stronger liquidity shock
at home than countries that rely more on foreign direct investment, 1 and long-term
debt plays an important role in credit risk and business cycle dynamics.2
In this paper, we study the role of the quality of domestic institutions in determin-
ing the composition of external liabilities as well as domestic funding structure of
investment. In our theory, different degrees of investor patience together with the
strength of property rights protection will determine who invest in equity and who
invest in bonds/loans. Productivity (or future payoff) differs across projects. This,
together with the strength of contract enforcement, will determine the share of long-
term debt in total debt. The key mechanism is that as institutional quality strengthens,
it reduces the expropriation risk faced by the equity investors and thus promotes
equity financing. In the meantime, high institutional quality enhances the protection
of property rights and the enforcement of contracts, therefore it stimulates long-term
debt financing. Overall, high institutional quality leads to both larger equity share in
total financing and larger share of long-term debt in total debt financing.
We take these predictions to data in two ways. First, we examine the structure of
a country’s external liabilities. We find that countries with stronger institutions tend
to have more equity investment (especially foreign direct investment) as a share of
their total external liabilities, and more long-term debt as a share of their external
debt. These patterns are consistent with the model predictions. Second, we examine
1Tong and Wei (2010), Claessens et al. (2012))
2Gomes et al. (2016) and Miao and Wang (2010)
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the patterns of capital structure of publicly listed firms across countries and find
interesting systematic differences across countries. In particular, firms in countries
with stronger public institutions tend to have a higher share of equity and to issue
more long-term debt relative to short-term debt. These patterns are also consistent
with the model predictions.
This paper builds on the two strands of literature - optimal capital structure
and governance quality and extends the existing literature on both empirical and
theoretical aspects. First, the paper is related to a growing literature on the impacts of
governance quality and financial decisions. Gelos and Wei (2002) documents that the
quality of a country’s domestic institutions in the area of transparency appears to be a
significant risk factor in international mutual funds’ portfolio holdings. In particular,
countries with more opaque institutions tend to attract less equity investment relative
to the prediction of a standard international capital asset pricing model (where a
country’s share of global equity investment should be proportional to its investable
assets as a share of the total international equity market). The paper does not examine
the determination of relative size of equity versus debt, or the maturity structure of
debt. Fratzscher (2012) analyzes institutional quality as one of the determinants of
the capital inflow volumes, and Mukherjee (2015) also explores institutional quality
in shaping the diversification of international portfolio. However, this paper differs
from them in the aspect of investigating the role of institutional quality in the capital
structure: ratio of equity and debt and maturity structure of debt. Alfaro et al. (2008)
looks into the positive impact of institutional quality in attracting one specific type of
inflow - foreign direct investment - but not on the other capital types. Our work sheds
further light on not only FDI but also debt and equity, and it incorporates the trade-
offs among different types of capital flow. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) documents
changes in the leverage ratios by firms and banks across countries before and after
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the recent global financial crisis. One interesting finding is that countries with better
institutions exhibit less de-leveraging by their banks during the crisis. The paper is
meant to be descriptive and does not propose or test any formal theory of capital
structure of nations. Klein (2005) documents a non-monotonic interaction between
the responsiveness of growth to capital account liberalization and institutional quality,
and our work provides complementary evidence on how institutional quality affects
capital structure, which is an important aspect of financial development and growth.
Forbes et al. (2017) uses UK’s Funding for Lending Scheme as a natural experiment
and finds that in response to higher capital requirements, UK banks cut lending more
to countries with weaker institutions. Qian and Strahan (2007) finds that creditor
rights index and effectiveness of contract enforcement are important determinants
of bank loan contracts. Our finding confirms that institutional quality is crucial in
affecting the quantity of debt flow, and it particularly points out the importance of
governance quality in shaping the maturity of external debt.
Second, this paper contributes to a large literature on capital structure determina-
tion both on corporate finance and nation’s aggregate finance. For instance, Bolton
and Scharfstein (1996) builds the insight that banks and bondholders differ in their
degree of flexibility in times of financial distress, and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) sur-
vey the classic theories in the literature of corporate financing decisions. More recent
studies include De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) highlighting the asymmetric information
between loan finance intermediary and bond finance intermediary. Crouzet (2014)
endogenizes capital structure in a model with banks and market lenders differing in
their ability to deal with financial distress. The closest one to our work is Brunner-
meier and Oehmke (2013). They explain the prevailing short-term debt by inability
to commit to a maturity structure by borrowers. In particular, borrowers have an
incentive to shorten the maturity of an individual creditor’s debt contract because
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borrowers can effectively gain from diluting other creditors’ claims in the event of
a bankruptcy. In response, all creditors would opt for short term debt contracts.
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) does not discuss the debt-equity ratio within a
common framework with debt maturity, and does not engage in empirical investiga-
tion. In comparison, we will incorporate the risk of dilution of rights that long-term
creditors face as a key element of our model. On the other hand, we will engage in
extensive empirical investigations connecting institutional quality and equity/debt
ratio and maturity structure of debt for both external liabilities across nations and
capital structure of firms across countries.
On the nation’s aggregate capital structure, there is also a growing literature. Razin
et al. (1998) develops a pecking order of international capital flows with a model of
asymmetric information. Goldstein and Razin (2006) extends asymmetric information
to a model foreign direct investments and foreign portfolio investments. Bolton
and Huang (2016) takes a corporate finance approach to analyze debt and currency
financing of a nation’s investments. Chang et al. (2017) develops a dynamic model
to study the a rebalancing from bank loans towards bond of emerging economy’s
external financing. The existing papers have provided frameworks to analyze the
capital structure in terms of equity (including FDI) and debt, yet the maturity structure
is not included in the theoretical consideration. Therefore, one contribution of this
paper is to endogenize debt financing with multiple maturities and embed it in a
model that simultaneously determines equity/debt ratio. Our theory is a succinct
and simple one. Future research can enrich the model with more details, such as the
distinction between FDI versus investment in the stock market by foreign investors,
or the distinction between bonds and bank loans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical
model that connects public governance to the capital structure of nations. Section
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3 describes the data. Section 4 supplies the empirical evidence based on balance-
of-payments data. Section 5 examines firm-level capital structure and relates it to
country-level quality of governance. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
3.2 The Model
Consider a three-period model of financing choice. A production project starts in
period 0 and needs a start-up funding that is normalized to one and has to come en-
tirely from external financing. After the project is initiated, the payoff will materialize
in period 2. The payoff takes two values 1 and 2, where the probability of resulting in
a high payoff (θ) is a random variable with a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. There is a
large number of potential investors who differ in the probability (λ) of being hit by a
liquidity shock in period 1, and λ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
There are three channels via which an investor can fund a project: equity (includ-
ing FDI), long-term debt, and short-term debt. Each investor has an identical outside
option as that pays an interest rate of r∗. We adopt the framework of Goldstein
and Razin (2006): if investors choose to finance a project as equity holders, they
become the full owner of the project. If investors choose debt financing, regardless of
the maturity, then there needs to be an outsider to manage the project. With these
simplifying assumptions, the model does not discuss a split between internal and
external financing. Instead, it focuses on the determination of the structure of external
financing. All investors and entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk neutral.3
The time line of the model goes as follows. In period 0, investors choose among
three forms of financing: equity, long-term debt, or short-term debt investment.
Payoff shock (θ) is realized in the same period right after the investment takes place,
but its value is only accessible by the entrepreneurs. In period 1, the liquidity shock
3Risk neutrality simplifies the derivation, and risk aversion will only make quantitative differences.
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to investors arrives, upon which the investors need to sell the projects to ease the
liquidity shortage. At the time of fire-sale and after the realization of liquidity shock,
θ becomes known to debt investors, and the short-term debt investors can make use
of the new information to determine the face value of the short-term debt maturing
in period 2. In period 2, when the project’s payoff materializes, the debt repayment















Investor heterogeneity is described by the probability of a liquidity shock, λ,
which is known to the investors before they make their investment decisions, whereas
project heterogeneity is described by project productivity θ (or the probability of
a high payoff in period 2), which is known to the entrepreneurs but not to any
investor in period 0. Project productivity θ becomes known to all investors in period
1. Investors who hold a one-period bond in t=1 can choose to buy a new rollover
one-period bond at t=1 or sit on the sidelines. Investors who hold a long term bond
can choose to sell their bond in the secondary market at t=1 or do nothing at t=1 and
wait for the bond to mature at t=2.
Institutional quality or quality of public governance can affect the economy in
two ways. First, high quality institutions constrain expropriation risk faced by equity
investors. Severity of expropriation risk can be represented by a tax on the payoff
of equity: an equity investor’s net gain in period 2 will be the gross payoff of the
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project net of the expropriation tax. Unlike a formal tax, an expropriation tax does
not generate revenue for the government. Therefore, we model the expropriation risk
as a dead weight loss that is algebraically similar to a proportional tax on the project’s
payoff to the investors.
Second, high quality institutions lead to better enforcement of contracts. In the
context of financial contract, the ability to protect long-term creditors’ seniority can
be linked to quality of institutions. When a borrower issues a long-term debt, it may
promise to make the long-term debt senior to all future short-term debt. But when
it comes time to roll-over short-term debt, the borrower can obtain a better price on
the short-term borrowing if it can promise equal seniority for the short-term debt
as the long-term debt in the event of a default. The likelihood for the borrowers to
deviate from the promise to the long-term debt without punishment represents an
expropriation risk for long-term debt holders.
Both dimensions of institutional quality capture a wide range of instances includ-
ing control of corruption, strength of law enforcement, and government efficiency.
However, these two emphasize different aspects of institutional quality, hence, they
can be separated from each other. For this reason, we use two different parameters to
represent them in our theoretical model. In practice, the two are highly correlated:
countries with a high expropriation risks on equity investors are also likely to have
weak contract enforcement environment that protects the rights of long-term debt
holders relative to those of short-term debt holders. In subsequent empirical work,
we use proxies for measure them jointly.
Since the agents in the model make decisions sequentially, we solve the model
backwards by deriving the expected profits in investment strategies one by one.
Comparing the expected profits of all strategies, we obtain the equilibrium capital
structure.
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Before presenting the detailed solution, it might be useful to discuss the assump-
tions that we specify in the model. First, the size of each project is set to be one. With
this assumption, we abstract away from the intensive margin of investment and focus
on the trade-off among different forms of financing arrangements. Second, investors
are assumed to have an informational advantage relative to the public - they know
the true probability θ of a high state (high payoff of the project) in fire-sale, whereas
the public would have no access to this information in period one. Third, the model
features two kinds of heterogeneity: heterogeneous probability θ of high payoff across
projects, and heterogeneous probability λ of a liquidity shock across investors. The
first can be viewed as different productivity, and the second can represent different
patience levels or strength of financial status of investors. They will collectively
determine interior solutions to the financing arrangement.
For the rest of the session, we will illustrate the investment strategies’ expected
payoff in the order of equity, short-term, and long-term debt with the backward
approach. We then combine the results and discuss the overall capital structure.
3.2.1 Equity
Considering the equity investment, in period 2, if the project is not sold, since the
equity investor is the owner of the project and the project is materialized, her expected
payoff is
pi = 1+ θ
In period 1, some investors are hit by a liquidity shock and are forced to sell the
project. There are sufficiently large amount of potential buyers whose outside option
is a risk-free investment with return rate r∗, therefore the fire-sale price of the project
will be 1+ r∗. Upon the realization of liquidity shocks, the equity investors who are
hit by the liquidity shock sell their projects and obtain 1+ r∗, while the rest will hold
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their equities until the end of the projects.













The first term is the return if fire-sale, which happens with probability λ. The
second term is the return if holding the projects to maturity, which is equal to the
expected value of the project’s return. Because equity investors differ from each other
in terms of the liquidity shock probability, the expected return of equity investment
depends on the liquidity shock probability λ. The lower the λ is, the higher probability
of avoiding fire-sale and receiving the return rate of mature projects.
To consider the role of institutional quality in equity financing, we assume that the
government expropriates τE proportion of the equity payoff. As a result, the after-tax
expected payoff is
VE(λ) = (1− τE)
(







Debt investors differ from equity investors in terms of the return rate of holding
the project investment to maturity. Equity investors essentially owns the project
and are entitled to the overall value of the projects when they are materialized. In
contrast, debt investors will be paid the face value of the debt contract if no default,
and will only be able to seize the residual value of the projects if default. As a result,
entrepreneurs’ profit maximization problem does not align with debt investors’, and
they have an incentive to minimize the cost of issuing debt. Given a large number
of potential investors, entrepreneurs will only sign the debt contracts if the expected
cost of debt is equal to the reservation level of potential investors: 1+ r∗.
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There are two types of debt contracts that an entrepreneur can offer to debt
investors: a long-term debt with face value d02 in the second period (and no payoff in
the first period), and a short-term debt with face value d01 at the end of period 1. If a
project only receives a one-period loan, by necessity, it has to be financed by another
short-term (rollover) debt in period 1. We denote the face value of the rollover debt
as d12 in period 1. Because of the abundance of potential investors, the return rate
on debt per period will be the same as deposit rate r∗ to make the investors exactly
indifferent between taking the outside option and investing in the project.
Similar to equity investors, debt investors are also subject to a liquidity shock,
which, for holders of a two-period debt, would trigger a fire-sale of their debt con-
tracts. When debt investors are forced to sell in period 1, for both the entrepreneurs
and the investors, it is essentially equivalent to roll-over short-term debt. Therefore,
the fire-sale price will be evaluated in the same way as the roll-over return rate. Note
that, entrepreneurs will only offer the roll-over return rate at the reservation level of
potential investors (1+ r∗), therefore, the debt contracts’ fire-sale also yields the same
price as equity fire-sale.
We solve for the maturity structure by guess-and-verify. Since there are two
types of debt contracts, if they are offered by firms with different productivity levels
(probability of a high payoff), then investors will be able to update the expectation of
the payoff when the debt matures. Therefore, we conjecture that there is a threshold
value of the probability of a high project payoff, θ∗, below which the entrepreneur
would offer a long-term debt contract and above which he would offer a short-term
debt contract.
Consider the case where only long-term debt is feasible: the corresponding break-






1− θ + θd02
]
dθ = (1+ r∗)2 (3.3)
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The first term (1− θ) on the left-hand side is the payoff to a long-term debt in
default, and the second is the non-default case where debt is paid at full face value.
To see whether the case of only long-term debt is sustainable or not, we investigate
whether the entrepreneur has an incentive to deviate on the margin. Since short-term
creditors will be informed of the true value of θ in period 1, the break-even condition




+ θ∗d12 = 1+ r∗ (3.4)
The first term in equation (3.4) indicates the payoff in the case of default, which
happens with probability (1− θ∗).4 The second term represents the payoff in the case
of repayment, which is associated with probability θ∗, and debt investors receive the
face value set in the debt contract.
Compared to the long-term counterpart, there are two differences. First, since the
true value of productivity is available to the short-term creditor when deciding on the
face value of short-term debt rollover, the rollover debt value d12 will be determined
according to the true value of θ instead of the ex-ante expectation. Second, it is not
always true that the short-term creditor will be able to seize the residual value of the
project in default, and it is reflected in the first term on the left-hand-side of the break-
even condition. Given default, a short-term creditor is able to seize residual values of
the project only when the seniority of a long-term creditor is not well-defended (with
probability τD), which means that the short-term creditor has the same priority to
seize the value of the project.
With these differences, the long-term debt face value will only depend on the
threshold productivity θ∗, while the short-term rollover face value will be a function
4Here, since we consider the first potential short-term creditor, whose measure is zero, the overall
debt d¯ = αd12 + (1− α)d02 is equal to d02. Also, since the expected payoff is larger than one, low
productivity directly leads to default. Under the current assumption, the high productivity is large
enough to pay back the debt while the low productivity is not enough to pay back the debt (expected
return rate is r∗), therefore the default probability is 1− θ∗.
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of the true productivity θ. After comparing the face values of the long-term (d02) and
short-term (d12) debts, the entrepreneur will choose the lower face value to finance
the project.
To determine the threshold productivity θ∗, we note that at that threshold, the
entrepreneur should be indifferent between offering a short-term and a long-term
debt, which translates to the following condition:
d02(θ∗) = d12(θ∗) (3.5)
Plugging the indifference condition to the two break-even conditions yields the value
of θ∗.
Proposition 3. The entrepreneur will propose a debt contract based on the project’s produc-
tivity. If θ < θ∗, the borrowing will be in long-term debt. If θ > θ∗, the borrowing will be in
short-term debt. If θ = θ∗, the entrepreneur will be indifferent between the two forms of debt
contracts. θ∗ is determined by (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5).
It can be verified that the entrepreneurs whose project’s productivity is lower
than θ∗ have no incentive to deviate from long-term debt contract, and so with
the entrepreneurs whose project’s productivity is higher than θ∗.5 The intuition
is that since the short-term creditors will be able to work out the true value of θ
when choosing the rollover face value, they will demand a high face value if the
productivity is low.
Those projects with a relatively low productivity will find the long-term face
value (without the knowledge of true productivity on the creditors’ side) to be lower
than the short-term rollover face value. In contrast, projects with a sufficiently high
probability of a high payoff can benefit from a chance to update the creditor about
5Proof is provided in Appendix A.
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the true productivity in period 1 and obtain a relatively favorable (i.e., low) rollover
face value, which would increase the payoff to the entrepreneur.
3.2.3 Capital Structure
Combining the results, we can determine the capital structure in two steps. In the
first step, since the debt contract always yields the payoff of (1+ r∗)2, a comparison
between the equity investment expected payoff VE(λ) and (1+ r∗)2 determines the
threshold λE below which the equity investment will be implemented. In the second
step, Proposition 3 solves for the composition of long-term and short-term debt
contracts.
As discussed before, the equity investment payoff is negatively related to the
expropriation risk τE, therefore the lower the expropriation risk (higher institutional
quality), the larger is the proportion of projects financed by equity investment. This
relationship is formally summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The share of equity investment in total investment increases with institu-
tional quality.
The proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward. As the net payoff of equity invest-
ment is negatively correlated with the expropriation tax and positively correlated
with institutional quality, the threshold λ which makes potential investors indifferent
between equity financing and debt financing increases with institutional quality.
With regard to the debt maturity, poorer institutional quality translates into poorer
protection of long-term debt holders’ seniority (i.e., higher τD), reducing the amount
of long-term debt in equilibrium. This suggests a positive relationship between the
amount of long-term debt as a share of total debt and institutional quality, which can
be stated by Proposition A1.
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Proposition 5. The share of long-term debt in total debt increases with institutional quality.
The proof of Proposition 3 follows that the higher the chance to be granted the
equal seniority as long-term debt investors, the lower roll-over face value the short-
term debt investors will ask. In the meantime, given a higher probability to have to
share the residual value of the projects with short-term debt investors in the case of
default, long-term debt investors will demand a higher expected return which leads
to a higher threshold of productivity.
Based on Proposition 2 and 3, for a given level of institutional quality, the capital
structure can be described by a partition of the (λ, θ) space. Those investors with a
relatively low λ ≤ λ∗ - relatively patient investors - would choose to provide equity
financing, and those with a relatively high λ > λ∗ would choose to provide debt
financing. On the other hand, entrepreneurs with a high project productivity (θ ≥ θ∗)
would choose to ask for short-term debt financing (in hope of obtaining an attractive
rollover bond price at t=1), and those with a low project productivity (θ < θ∗) would
ask for long-term debt financing. This defines the equilibrium capital structure for
given institutional quality. As a graphic example, patterns of equilibrium capital
structure for the case of τE = τD = 0.2 and r∗ = 0.05 are summarized by the left
graph of Figure 3.1. With a relatively low risk of expropriation, equity financing is
the most important source of funding for investment.
As institutional quality deteriorates, the area for equity financing shrinks, and
among debt financing, the share of long-term debt financing also declines. The cali-
bration results for the case of worse institutions, τE = τD = 0.8 (and still r∗ = 0.05)
are summarized by the right graph of Figure 3.1. With a relatively high risk of expro-
priation, short-term debt becomes the dominant source of funding for investment.
As another way to illustrate Propositions 4 and 5, we plot the share of equity
in total investment, and the share of long-term debt in total debt, respectively, as
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Figure 3.1: Capital Structure: High Institutional Quality vs. Low Institutional Quality
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Figure 3.2: Capital Structure and Institutional Quality
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a function of the severity of expropriation risk (under the assumption of τE = τD
and r∗ = 0.05). The results are in Figure 3.2. The simulation demonstrates that
equity investment declines with deterioration of institutional quality and so does
the share of long-term debt. When the institutional quality is sufficiently poor (e.g.,
τE = τD > 0.9), then the only available form of financing would be short-term debt.
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3.3 The Data
In this section, we introduce the datasets that we employ for the empirical analysis
on the relationship between capital structure and institutional quality. Our empirical
exercise will start with the composition of a nation’s external liabilities from balance-
of-payments data: the share of equity (including FDI6) in total external financing, and
the share of long-term debt in total external debt.
We combine two primary data sources: the External Wealth of Nations (EWN)
Dataset data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and the Quarterly External Debt
(QED) Statistics maintained jointly by BIS, IMF, and the World Bank. The EWN
Dataset provides a detailed break-down of international investment positions by
investment type at an annual frequency for most IMF member countries. We define
the share of equity in the total financing of each country i at year t by:
equityit =
FDI liabilitiesit + portfolio equity liabilitiesit
total liabilitiesit
Since the EWN Dataset does not contain information on the maturity structure of
loans and deposits, we make use of the relatively new QED Statistics, which collects
the external debt of each country by maturity at a quarterly frequency starting from
1998. We calculate the share of long-term debt in total debt as follows:
long-termit =
long-term debt of commercial banksit + long-term debt of other sectorsit
total debt of commercial banks and other sectorsit
The final data set includes an unbalanced panel of the equity shares for 123 countries
with a maximum time span from 1998 to 2011, and an unbalanced panel of the
long-term debt shares for 93 countries with a maximum span from 1998 to 2014.
6FDI is included in equity financing here. There has been work discussing that part of FDI is in the
form of intra-firm debt financing within multinational firms. However, what matters most is what
form it is reported because it will determine in what way it will be affected by institutional quality.
For instance, even if an FDI is in fact debt financing, as it is reported officially as FDI it will be subject
to the regulations with respect to FDI. That said, in Appendix D we still separately analyze FDI and
equity portfolio investment for robustness check.
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Other macro statistics such as real GDP per capita, private sector debt as a share
of GDP (a proxy for level of the financial development), and trade volume as a share
of GDP (a proxy for the trade openness), are relatively standard and come from the
World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank.
The institutional quality data is compiled from the World Bank Institute (WBI).
Each year, the WBI uses all available data on institutional quality and proposes a set of
six measures: control of corruption, government efficiency, political stability, regula-
tory quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability. All the indices are constructed
in such a way that each is bound between (-2, +2), and a higher value means a higher
quality of institution. Note, while the six dimensions can in principle capture different
aspects of a country’s public institutions and governance, the pairwise correlations
among them are all positive and in excess of 70%. The exact pairwise correlations are
reported in Table C1. Therefore, out of practical considerations, we will use the simple
average of the six measures as a composite measure of the quality of institutions. The
summary statistics of the variables on the nation’s external financing are reported in
Table C2.
On the domestic side, aggregate measures of capital structure are relatively scarce7,
so we turn to firm-level micro data. There are two data samples that we constructed:
a world-wide sample of listed firms from Worldscope and an European firms sample
(both listed and private) from Amadeus of Bureau van Dijk.8 Both of them have their
own merits as the former one provides a comprehensive picture of the listed firms
from different types of countries and the latter one offers a close look at both the
listed and the private firms. For each firm in the sample, we define the share of equity
7The World Financial Development dataset from the World Bank contains the information on the
measures of financing, but the data is only available for major emerging countries. Also, the measures
are based on firm survey whose sample is relatively small compared to the existing firm-level datasets.
8The results of Amadeus sample is in Appendix C.
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financing and the share of long-term debt as follows:
equity f t =
shareholders funds f t
total liability f t
long-term f t =
long-term debt f t
total debt f t
After excluding the financial sector and public administration sector along with
outliers, the Worldscope sample contains 130,167 firms from 2003 to 2015, and the
Amadeus sample yields over 3 million observations from 2004 to 2015. The country
composition and summary statistics can be found in Table C3, Table C4, Table C6,
and Table C7, respectively.
3.4 Capital Structure of External Financing
Based on the theoretical results, there are two hypotheses that we would like to test
the relationship between capital structure and institutional quality.
Hypothesis 1: The share of equity financing is positively correlated with institutional
quality.
Hypothesis 2: The share of long-term debt financing is positively correlated with
institutional quality.
As we discussed before, the underlying mechanism of the first hypothesis is that
the improvement in institutional quality reduces expropriation risk and motivates
investors to pursue ownership of target firm’s equity, and the second hypothesis is
the channel that better institutional quality enhances the seniority of long-term debt
and eases the investor’s concern of debt dilution.
To begin with, we plot the relationship between capital structure and institutional
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quality in Figure 3.3.9 The pattern clearly shows a significant positive relationship
between equity financing/long-term debt financing with institutional quality. To
rigorously analyze the relationship, we begin with a simple cross-sectional OLS (with
the cross-section data of the average value across years of each country) controlling
for real GDP per capita, trade, and financial development to see the conditional
relationship. The results are presented in the first and fourth columns of Table 3.1.
The conditional relationship indicates a positive correlation between long-term debt
financing and institutional quality while insignificant regarding equity financing. OLS
regression could be contaminated by unobservable country specific characteristics,
therefore we utilize the cross-time variation within each country and estimate a
country fixed-effect panel model as well. The third and last columns in Table 3.1 reveal
the significant positively correlation of both equity financing and long-term debt
financing with institutional quality, which means that along with the improvement of
institutional quality within a country, the foreign investors becomes more willing to
hold equity shares and extend a longer maturity of debt.
Although we control for real GDP per capital, trade, and financial development
9Country and year fixed effects are controlled here.
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(consistent with literature, such as Faria and Mauro (2009)), there can still exist
unobservables that potentially contaminate the estimates. To address the endogeneity
issue, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Alesina and Zhuravskaya
(2011) suggest that linguistically more segregated countries, i.e., those where different
linguistic groups live more spatially separated, have a lower quality of government.
We use language segregation as an IV for institutional quality. As constructed by
Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011), the index of segregation is a population-weighted
average of homogeneity across groups within country based on historical data. As
the index of segregation does not allow across-time variation, we run 2SLS on the
cross-section sample.
The second and the fifth columns in Table 3.1 present the 2SLS results. Firstly,
consistent with Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011), the significant correlation between
institutional quality and language segregation supports the strongly negative rela-
tionship between linguistic segregation and institutional quality. Secondly, the weak
IV test validates language segregation as a strong instrument for institutional quality.
Thirdly, the IV estimates indicate strongly positive impact of institutional quality on
boosting cross-border equity financing and long-term external debt. An improvement
in institutional quality by one standard deviation (about 0.85) would increase the
share of equity in total liability by 35% (more than two standard deviations) and raise
the share of long-term debt in total debt by 15% (about 0.7 standard deviation). These
effects are both economically significant and statistically significant.
Besides the baseline analysis, we conduct three sets of robustness checks. First, one
concern about the cross-sectional analysis is that different countries enter the sample
in different years due to data availability, therefore the effect of institutional quality
on external capital structure may be driven by the difference in the development
stage across countries. To address this issue, we take a balanced panel from 2002 to
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2014 and redo the IV regressions. As shown in Table 3.2, the effects of institutional
quality in promoting equity and long-term debt financing remain significant.
Second, foreign reserves could be an omitted variable. As part of development,
central banks may accumulate foreign reserves as macro-prudential policy, in the
meantime, government may strengthen institutional quality. Therefore, foreign
reserves may be correlated with institutional quality. Moreover, higher foreign
reserves reduces the financial risk of the country, therefore international investors are
willing to conduct equity investment and long-term debt investment. To check this
omitted variable bias, we add foreign reserves as an additional control in the baseline
specification. Table 3.3 presents the results: foreign reserve is indeed positively
correlated with equity financing share and long-term debt share, but the positive
effect generated by institutional quality improvement stands significant.
Thirdly, given the dependent variable is the proportion of equity or debt financing,
which takes value between zero and one, it worth checking with the Logit regression
to see whether the linear regression results are robust. Table 3.4 shows the regressions
with the Logit specifications, and the positive correlation between equity or long-term
debt and institutional quality remains very robust.
3.5 Structure of Domestic Financing and Institutional
Quality
While the previous section examines the structure of the external liabilities of nations,
we now turn attention to capital structure at the firm level. While firms can obtain
financing from both domestic and international sources, domestic financing would be
the more important source in most cases. For a given country (and therefore a given
national level governance), there will be a distribution of capital structure across firms.
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Table 3.1: External Capital Structure and Institutional Quality
equity long-term debt
ols IV panel ols IV panel
institutional quality -0.015 0.413∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.136∗
(0.033) (0.127) (0.039) (0.014) (0.060) (0.079)
ln GDP per capita 0.013 -0.149∗∗∗ 0.110 -0.071∗ -0.088∗∗ 0.021
(0.007) (0.028) (0.072) (0.018) (0.043) (0.135)
private credit/GDP -0.023 -0.244∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ 0.054
(0.102) (0.113) (0.041) (0.011) (0.011) (0.035)
trade/GDP 0.045 0.011 0.040 -0.108∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.053
(0.016) (0.080) (0.037) (0.022) (0.045) (0.076)
N 123 79 1331 92 58 885
First stage regression





Note: This table examines the relationship between external capital structure and institutional
quality. The first three columns are for the share of equity portfolio investment, and the last
three are for the share of long-term debt (relative to total debt). Column (1) and (4) are the
OLS regression on the cross-section sample, column (2) and (5) are the IV 2SLS results of
language segmentation on the cross-section sample, and (3) and (6) are the panel fixed effect
results. Standard error clustered at country level for OLS and IV, at country-year level for
panel, reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Our research question is whether and how different levels of national institutional
quality across different countries and over time shift the distribution of firm-level
capital structure.
We undertake three types of exercises. First, using data on all listed firms in 61
countries covered by Worldscope, we investigate the relationship between firm-level
capital structure and national level institutional quality for listed firms. Second, since
the change in institutional quality given a short horizon is usually less significant than
firm-level financial characteristics, we take a long-difference perspective and analyze
the relationship between change in capital structure and change in institutional quality.
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Table 3.2: External Capital Structure and Institutional Quality -
Balanced Sample
equity long-term debt
ols IV ols IV
institutional quality 0.007 0.054∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.021) (0.058) (0.135)
ln GDP per capita -0.006 -0.040 0.069 -0.267∗∗
(0.065) (0.028) (0.045) (0.082)
private credit/GDP -0.051 -0.151∗ 0.050 -0.482∗∗
(0.088) (0.044) (0.089) (0.218)
trade/GDP 0.059 -0.112∗∗ 0.130∗ -0.335∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.020) (0.070) (0.091)
N 66 66 51 51





Note: This table examines the relationship between external capital struc-
ture and institutional quality using a balance sample from 2002 to 2014.
The first two columns are for the share of equity portfolio investment,
and the last two are for the share of long-term debt (relative to total debt).
Column (1) and (3) are the OLS regression on the cross-section sample,
column (2) and (4) are the IV 2SLS results of language segmentation on
the cross-section sample. Standard error clustered at country level for
OLS and IV, at country-year level for panel, reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** indicate significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Third, as internal fund is a part of the funding sources, we investigate how the share
of internal funding is affected by institutional quality by utilizing the Compustat
executives’ compensation data. In appendix C, using data on both listed and unlisted
European firms available from Amadeus, we also investigate if the relationship holds
for both listed and non-listed firms and if there is any difference between the two
types of firms.
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Table 3.3: External Liability and Institutional Quality - Control for Foreign Reserves
equity long-term debt
ols IV panel ols IV panel
institutional quality -0.004 0.212∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.052∗ 0.181∗ 0.130∗
(0.030) (0.078) (0.038) (0.016) (0.104) (0.072)
ln GDP per capita 0.011 -0.069∗∗∗ 0.104 -0.032 -0.086∗∗ 0.098
(0.007) (0.009) (0.072) (0.034) (0.041) (0.117)
private credit/GDP -0.017 -0.120∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ 0.051
(0.108) (0.068) (0.038) (0.014) (0.037) (0.047)
trade/GDp 0.031 0.026 0.057 -0.116∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.093
(0.024) (0.054) (0.039) (0.026) (0.036) (0.074)
foreign reserves 0.096 0.428∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.216 0.368∗∗ -0.004
(0.060) (0.113) (0.085) (0.259) (0.154) (0.106)
N 123 79 1303 83 57 625
First stage regression





Note: This table examines the relationship between external capital structure and institutional
quality adding foreign reserves as an additional control. The first two columns are for the share
of equity portfolio investment, and the last two are for the share of long-term debt (relative to
total debt). Column (1) and (3) are the OLS regression on the cross-section sample, column (2)
and (4) are the IV 2SLS results of language segmentation on the cross-section sample. Standard
error clustered at country level for OLS and IV, at country-year level for panel, reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
3.5.1 The Capital Structure of Listed Firms
We begin with all listed firms in 61 countries covered by the Worldscope database.
Using detailed balance sheet information of the these firms, we construct the share of
equity in total liabilities and the share of long-term debt in total debt. We relate each
to country-level institutional quality in two bin scatter plots reported in Figure 3.4.
We observe a positive slope in both plots. On average, both shares rise as a country’s
institutional quality improves.
We now turn to regression analysis where we can control for other variables,
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Table 3.4: External Capital Structure and Institutional Quality - Logit
equity long-term debt
Logit Logit IV Logit panel Logit Logit IV Logit panel
institutional quality -0.028 1.748∗∗ 0.523∗∗ 0.483∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗
(0.190) (0.579) (0.192) (0.089) (0.225) (0.193)
ln GDP per capita 0.065 -0.616∗∗∗ 0.416 -0.345∗ -0.398∗∗ 0.056
(0.024) (0.086) (0.341) (0.110) (0.172) (0.233)
private credit/GDP -0.133 -1.055∗∗ -0.648∗∗ -0.521∗ -1.235∗∗∗ 0.227∗
(0.463) (0.513) (0.220) (0.137) (0.061) (0.121)
trade/GDP 0.213 0.067 0.197 -0.591∗∗ -1.047∗∗∗ -0.280∗
(0.081) (0.354) (0.183) (0.132) (0.206) (0.162)
N 123 79 1331 92 58 885
First stage regression





Note: This table examines the relationship between external capital structure and institu-
tional quality using Logit specifications. The first three columns are for the share of equity
portfolio investment, and the last three are for the share of long-term debt (relative to total
debt). Column (1) and (4) are the Logit regression on the cross-section sample, column
(2) and (5) are the IV 2SLS results of language segmentation on the cross-section sample,
and (3) and (6) are the panel fixed effect results. Standard error clustered at country level
for Logit and IV, at country-year level for panel, reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
especially firm-level characteristics deemed important by the existing literature. For
instance, Opler et al. (1999) suggest book-to-market ratio, size, cash flow, working
capital, leverage10 as determinants of the capital structure (in terms of liquidity
holdings), whereas Frank and Goyal (2003), and Frank and Goyal (2009) also add
fixed assets and sales as possible determinants. Rajan and Zingales (1995) consider
tangible asset, book-to-market ratio, sales, and profitability, and they are all included
in our regressions.
We present the results in Table 3.5 for equity and long-term debt. In Table 3.5, we
10Leverage is not included in the regression as it is highly correlated with the left-hand variable of
capital structure.
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first estimate the baseline specification with firm, country, and time fixed effects, and
this exercise is intended to estimate how firm-level capital structure evolves in differ-
ent time points as national institutional quality changes. Including year fixed effect is
to address the concern that the relationship between long-term debt and institutional
quality may be simultaneously driven by some underlying global trends; year fixed
effect is able to purge the effects of common global trends. All standard errors are
clustered at the country level (which is more general than the country-year level). As
shown in the first column, the coefficient of institutional quality on equity financing
is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, consistent with the notion that
better public institutions are associated with more equity financing. Based on the
point estimate, with an improvement in institutional quality by one standard devi-
ation, the share of equity financing increases by 5(0.062× 0.802) percentage points.
For the firm characteristics, liquidity, profit, and revenue promote equity financing
and long-term debt financing because they indicate optimistic perspective on future
cash flow. Total asset and especially fixed asset increase particularly strengthens debt
financing as more tangible assets can be used as pledgeable collateral.
In the second column, we lag all regressors by one year to ensure that they are
all pre-determined relative to the dependent variable. This exercise is to exclude the
possibility of reverse causality. The lagged control variables’ change makes very little
difference to the point estimate and the statistical significance of the coefficient on
institutional quality: with an improvement in institutional quality by one standard
deviation, the share of equity financing increases by 6.4 (0.080× 0.802) percentage
points.
In the third column, we control for global industry-specific patterns in the equity
financing. This is to allow for different capital structure in different industries due to
technological or industrial organizational reasons. The new regressor is added on top
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of controlling for firm fixed effects and global time trends. Unsurprisingly, firm level
equity financing share is positively correlated with average equity financing across
all firms in the same industry in the world. Although, with this additional control,
the coefficient on national institutional quality becomes smaller, it is still positive and
statistically significant and also close to the baseline estimate in the first column.
In the fourth column, similar to the external capital structure analysis, we check
the robustness of the results to Logit specification. The Logit panel fixed effect takes
care of the dependent variable ranging between zero and one. As shown in the table,
the positive relationship remains positive and significant.
In the last four columns of Table 3.5, we present a similar set of analysis for long-
term financing as a share of total debt financing. Same as the case for long-term
debt financing, in the fifth columns, we include firm, country, and year fixed effects.
The coefficient on institutional quality are both positive and statistically significant
at the 10% level. The point estimate indicates that with an improvement in public
institutional quality by one standard deviation, the equity share in total external
financing tends to go up by 0.802× 0.124 = 9.9 percentage points. The alternative
specifications with lagged control variables and industry-specific long-term debt
financing, in the last two columns, respectively, confirm the significant positive
relationship between institutional quality and long-term debt financing. The results
also provide a strong support for the baseline regression as the point estimate for the
relationship between institutional quality and long-term debt financing stays around
0.12 in all three specifications.
We can obtain more precise information on corporate bonds at issuance from the
Mergent Fixed Income Securities database (FISD). FISD reports issuing date, amount,
spread, and maturity. A given firm can of course issue multiple bonds in a year.
Therefore, for a given firm in a given year, we can compute the average maturity of
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its bonds weighted by the proceeds of each bond. We investigate the relationship
between the average bond maturity (at the firm level) and institutional quality (at the
national level). We use firm characteristics from Worldscope (after matching the firms
in the two databases) as controls, and we cluster all standard errors at the country
level.
The results are reported in Table 3.6. We see that the average maturity of corporate
bonds is significant positively correlated with institutional quality, and the estimates
in all three specifications are positive and significant at 5% level. Generally speaking,
with a standard deviation improvement in institutional quality, the average maturity
of corporate bonds would go up by 0.72 (0.24× 3.0) years.
To conclude, with better public governance, both equity share in total financing
and the maturity of debt would go up. The magnitude of the correlation is both
statistically and economically significant. These patterns are consistent with the
theory presented in Section 2 that high institutional quality is associated with external
financing tilting toward equity and long maturity debt.11
Next, we further inspect the aspect of institutional quality that is the most impor-
11The effect of institutional quality on capital structure could potentially differ along different levels
of institutional quality, and Appendix E explores this property.
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tant in influencing capital structure. So far, our measure of institutional quality is
the average of six indicators from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators:
corruption control, government efficiency, political stability, regulation quality, rule
of law, and voice accountability. While the pairwise correlations among the six indica-
tors are all in excess of 70% (see Table C1), it might be useful nonetheless to see which
subset of governance indicators may be the most relevant for the capital structure
question.
We re-run the regressions on the share of equity financing, where quality of
governance is measured by each of the six indicators individually, and report the
results in Table 3.7. Note that the specification includes firm and year fixed effects, and
the standard errors are clustered at the country level. We see that corruption control,
government efficiency, rule of law, and voice of accountability are the important ones
in explaining the share of equity financing. Of these, the share of equity financing
appears to be most responsive to variations in the strength of control of corruption
and voice of accountability. In comparison, political stability and regulation quality
are not statistically different from zero. These results are perhaps not too surprising
in light of our theory in which the relevant institutions are those that minimize the
expropriation risk of equity holders (e.g., tax on their equity returns).
We do a similar exercise for the share of long-term debt financing in total debt,
and report the results in Table 3.8. In this case, the most significant relationship is
between maturity of debt (measured in both share of long-term debt financing and
the maturity of corporate bond) and rule of law. This result is intuitive as the most
relevant institutional quality for long-term debt holders is how their long-term debt
holding are well protected without debt dilution, and rule of law plays a crucial role
in protecting the right of long-term debt holders against the dilution risk.
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Table 3.5: Institutional Quality and Capital Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
equity equity equity equity longdt longdt longdt longdt
institutional quality 0.062∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.369∗∗ 0.124∗ 0.119∗ 0.124∗ 0.447∗∗
(0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.112) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.228)
liquidity 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
revenue -0.001 0.004∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.005 0.016∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016)
growth -0.009∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021)
fixed_asset -0.003∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.014∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.016)
profit 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
ln GDP per capita -0.058∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.045 -0.051 -0.528
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.065) (0.096) (0.094) (0.095) (0.635)
inflation 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
financial development -0.032∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.149∗∗ 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.068) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.185)
tax rate -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
equity (industry) 0.372∗∗∗ 1.737∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.329)
long-term debt (industry) 0.294∗∗∗ 1.684∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.307)
N 121795 121795 121795 121795 121795 121795 121795 121795
CountryFE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
FirmFE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
YearFE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
IndTimeTrend N N Y Y N N Y Y
Note: This table examines the relationship between equity financing/long-term debt financing
and institutional quality with different fixed effects and controls. The first three columns are
for equity financing, and the last three are for long-term debt financing. Column (1) and (5)
contain firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Column (2) and (6) replace the control variables
with their lagged values. Column (3) and (7) control industry-level financing. Columns (4)
and (8) are Logit panel regressions. Standard errors are clustered at country level and reported
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
117
Table 3.6: Institutional Quality and Corporate Bond Maturity
(1) (2) (3)
maturity maturity maturity
institutional quality 3.032∗∗ 3.014∗∗ 2.902∗∗
(1.081) (1.085) (1.169)
liquidity 5.308∗∗∗ 3.475∗∗∗ 4.467∗∗∗
(0.549) (0.764) (0.542)
revenue -0.158∗∗ -0.048 -0.114
(0.053) (0.062) (0.083)
growth -0.315∗∗ -0.331∗∗ -0.034
(0.147) (0.138) (0.127)
fixed_asset 0.396∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.069) (0.041) (0.098)
profit 3.409∗∗∗ 3.312∗∗∗ 0.981
(0.364) (0.709) (0.676)
ln GDP per capita -4.078 -6.957 -12.824
(21.672) (20.890) (21.772)
inflation 0.042 -0.051 -0.257
(0.888) (0.904) (0.802)
financial development 1.722 1.700 4.928
(3.753) (3.826) (3.254)




N 2302 2302 2302
CountryFE Y Y Y
FirmFE Y Y Y
YearFE Y Y Y
IndTimeTrend N N Y
Note: This table examines the relationship between
corporate bond maturity and institutional quality with
different fixed effects and controls. Column (1) contains
firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Column (2)
replaces the control variables with their lagged values.
Column (3) controls industry-level financing. Standard
errors are clustered at country level and reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Equity and Different Measures of Institutional Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
corruption government rule political regulation voice
control efficiency of law stability quality accountability
institutional quality 0.033∗∗∗ 0.027 0.024∗∗ -0.016 0.037∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021)
revenue -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
growth -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
fixed_asset -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
profit 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln GDP per capita -0.062∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
inflation 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
financial development -0.024∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.034∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
tax rate -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 121795 121795 121795 121795 121795 121795
CountryFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
FirmFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
YearFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: This table examines the relationship between equity financing and different
measures of institutional quality. From column (1) to (6), the institutional quality is
corruption control, government efficiency, rule of law, political stability, regulation
quality, and voice accountability. Standard errors are clustered at country level and
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
3.5.2 Internal versus External Financing
The previous empirical evidence has shown that external financing, by means of
both equity financing and long-term debt financing, is positively correlated with
the improvement of institutional quality. However, besides external financing, firms
also make use of internal financing, and the share of internal financing is affected
by institutional quality too. In the literature, Myers and Majluf (1984) among many
others, show that - driven by different costs of financing - firm’s financing pecking
order starts with internal financing (the cheapest source of funding), followed by
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Table 3.8: Long-term Debt and Different Measures of Institutional Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
corruption government rule political regulation voice
control efficiency of law stability quality accountability
institutional quality 0.034∗ 0.060∗ 0.103∗ -0.001 0.049 0.049
(0.020) (0.034) (0.052) (0.008) (0.037) (0.043)
revenue 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
growth 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
fixed_asset 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
profit -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln GDP per capita -0.042 -0.038 -0.037 -0.029 -0.036 -0.040
(0.094) (0.091) (0.081) (0.096) (0.101) (0.100)
inflation -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
financial development 0.019 0.017 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.009
(0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
tax rate -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 121795 121795 121795 121795 121795 121795
CountryFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
FirmFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
YearFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: This table examines the relationship between long-term debt financing and
different measures of institutional quality. From column (1) to (6), the institutional
quality is corruption control, government efficiency, rule of law, political stability,
regulation quality, and voice accountability. Standard errors are clustered at country
level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
external debt or equity. Suppose the marginal costs of using either internal or external
financing are increasing and concave, the share of internal financing is determined by
where the marginal costs of the internal and external funding sources are equalized.
If improved institutional quality effectively reduces the borrowing cost of external
financing, then the share of internal financing is expected to be negatively correlated
with institutional quality. Appendix B provides an extension to the basic model
which allows for internal financing for a project. In that model, the share of internal
financing tends to decline as the institutional quality improves.
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To analyze this relationship between internal financing and institutional quality,
we employ the firm level data from Compustat. Based on the executive compen-
sation data in the database that is collected directly from each company’s annual
proxy (DEF14A SEC form), we compute the executives’ shareholding relative to total
outstanding shares as a proxy for internal financing. Table C5 reports the summary
statistics: the final sample contains over 10,000 observations from 1995 -2015 with US
firms accounting for the majority. Using the same regression specification as external
financing, we analyze the relationship between internal financing and institutional
quality, and the estimation results are reported in Table 3.9.12 The fixed effect esti-
mate shows a significantly negative correlation between institutional quality and the
share of internal financing: one standard deviation increase in institutional quality is
associated with 0.25 (0.009× 0.109/0.004) standard deviation decrease in the share
of internal financing. (As a robustness check, we also exclude all US firms from the
sample and re-do the estimation. We find the same patterns in the reduced sample.)
Given that executives’ shares represent a part of internal financing, our estimates
might be a lower bound for the relationship between internal financing and institu-
tional quality. Firm characteristics also matter. For instance, when liquidity, growth,
or profit grows, or when financial development deepens, our results show that they
tend to simultaneously increase the share of external financing and reduce the share
of internal financing.
3.5.3 Long-difference Analysis
Because institutional quality is likely to be a slow-moving variable, variations at the
annual frequency analysis might contain much noise. One way to reduce such noise
12As a majority of the firms in the sample are US firms, each US firm is assigned a weight based on
firm characteristics matching propensity score with the non-US firms, and the weight is then adjusted
to keep each country’s weighted sample size equal.
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Table 3.9: External/Internal Financing and Institutional Quality
external equity financing longdt internal equity financing
total financing total debt total financing
institutional quality 0.145∗∗ 0.234∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.082) (0.001)
liquidity 0.308∗∗∗ 0.145 -0.002∗
(0.079) (0.208) (0.001)
size -0.083∗∗∗ -0.055∗ 0.000
(0.015) (0.032) (0.000)
growth -0.012 0.066 -0.001∗∗
(0.029) (0.051) (0.000)
fixed asset -0.156∗∗ -0.411∗∗ 0.000
(0.069) (0.143) (0.001)
profit 0.629∗∗∗ -0.465 -0.005∗∗
(0.106) (0.355) (0.002)
ln GDP per capita 0.450∗∗∗ -0.198 -0.001
(0.122) (0.269) (0.002)
inflation -0.001 -0.007 0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.000)
financial development 0.034∗∗ 0.054 0.002∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.045) (0.000)
tax rate 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
N 11134 11134 11134
CountryFE Y Y Y
FirmFE Y Y Y
Note: This table examines the relationship between capital structure (both internal
and external financing) and institutional quality. Column (1), (2), and (3) are for
external equity financing, long-term debt financing, and internal equity financing,
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
and check for robustness of the conclusion is to perform long differencing. To include
as many firms as possible, we focus on comparing 2015 with 2003, and investigate
whether the changes in the distribution of firm-level capital structure across countries
are connected to the changes in the country-level institutional quality across countries
over the 12 year period.
In this span of time over a decade, there are significant changes in institutional
quality around the world but the extent of changes is uneven. This can be observed
in Figure 5. Table 3.10 reports a list of countries with both most deterioation in
institutional quality (including Greece, Hungary, Thailand) and most improvement
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Table 3.10: Top Ten and Bottom Ten Countries in the Change of Institutional Quality
(2003 vs. 2015)
bottom 10 ∆govq top 10 ∆govq
Greece -0.53 Indonesia 0.71
Hungary -0.45 Colombia 0.41
Thailand -0.41 Japan 0.27
Egypt -0.41 Poland 0.26
Spain -0.40 Philippines 0.23
Portugal -0.29 Singapore 0.19
Mexico -0.29 Germany 0.18
Italy -0.28 Switzerland 0.15
South Africa -0.17 Israel 0.13
in institutional quality (including Indonesia, Colombia, and Japan) from 2003 to 2015.
These relatively large movements in institutional quality provide significant varia-
tions for analyzing the relationship between institutional quality and capital structure.
In Figure 3.6, we plot the bin-scatter of the change in capital structure against that in
institutional quality, and the figure shows a solid positive relationship between the
two.
To compare the long-difference results with the short-run estimates before, we
adopt the same specification with firm and year fixed effects. From the results shown
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in Table 3.11, we find that the long-run relationship between institutional quality
and capital structure is consistently significant. Moreover, the point estimates are
both larger in magnitude compared to the short-run estimates. The significance
and magnitude in the long-run relationship provides more validity of our baseline
short-run analysis, as it is highly likely that the short-run effect that we estimate is
the lower bound of the long-run effect.
Setting the long-difference span as 2003 to 2015 allows us to fully utilize the
large change in institutional quality. At the same time, one concern is that the
global financial crisis might induce changes in the relationship between institutional
quality and capital structure. Therefore, we separate the long-difference into two
segments: 2003 to 2007, and 2007 to 2015. From the last four columns of Table
3.11, we can observe that the relationship between equity financing and institutional
quality is stronger in pre-crisis period, while the relationship between long-term debt
financing and institutional quality is prominent in post-crisis. Because debt financing
experienced the most adverse shock in the crisis, improvement in institutional quality
after the crisis might be especially helpful in obtaining longer term debt financing.
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Table 3.11: Long Difference
∆equity ∆longdt ∆equity ∆longdt ∆equity ∆longdt
2003-2015 2003-2015 2003-2007 2003-2007 2007-2015 2007-2015
∆institutional quality 0.240∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.122∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.010) (0.038) (0.066) (0.028) (0.156)
∆liquidity 0.003∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
∆size -0.000 0.019∗∗ 0.003 0.018∗∗ -0.005 0.022∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
∆growth -0.007 0.016 -0.014∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.011) (0.020) (0.006) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013)
∆fixed asset -0.001 0.011∗∗ 0.002 0.019∗∗∗ 0.002 0.018∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
∆profit 0.006∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
∆ln GDP per capita -0.013 0.285∗∗∗ 0.155 -0.113 -0.079∗∗ -0.238∗∗
(0.058) (0.074) (0.126) (0.126) (0.024) (0.102)
∆inflation -0.007 0.011 -0.001 -0.009 0.002 -0.026∗∗
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.002) (0.010)
∆financial development 0.082∗∗ 0.018 -0.039 0.059 0.028∗ 0.022
(0.033) (0.045) (0.029) (0.041) (0.014) (0.050)
∆tax rate -0.001 -0.006∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.001∗ -0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
N 7501 7501 7501 7501 7501 7501
Note: This table examines the relationship between capital structure and institutional
quality in long difference as 2003 vs. 2015. The first column is equity, and the second
one is long-term debt. Standard errors are clustered at country level and reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
3.6 Conclusion
The capital structure of firms and nations important for financial stability as well as
cost of capital. This paper examines the role of public governance in the capital struc-
ture of both nations and firms. We propose a simple theory in which the equity debt
ratio, and the share of long-term debt in total debt, are determined by institutional
quality, heterogeneity across investors in terms of liquidity risk, and heterogeneity
across firms (projects) in terms of underlying productivity. The key prediction is that
as institutions improve, equity financing as a share of total financing should rise, and
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long-term debt as a share of total debt should also rise.
We take these predictions to data on the structure of external liabilities (from
balance of payments) across countries, and find clear supportive evidence. We also
take the predictions to firm level data from Worldscope. We find that the cross-country
differences in the financing structure of firms depends on a country’s institutional
quality in ways that are consistent with the theory.
This paper documents the role of national institutions as an important common
determinant of the capital structure for all firms in a country and for the composition
of external liabilities of a country. Many extensions can be pursued. For example,
within debt, it might be useful to distinguish between loans from banks versus bonds
from the capital market. These are left for future research.
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Procedure for Constructing Index of Changes in Capital
Control
Based on AREAER, the construction of changes in capital controls takes the following
steps.
1. Extract the narratives of policies regarding capital transaction in the “Changes
in the previous year” at the end of country profile from AREAER.
Post-1998 years are directly downloaded from AREAER website. From 1983
to 1998 is extracted manually from each AREAER. Prior to 1983, the policies
are listed in the chronological manner without indicating whether it is about
capital transaction or not. Therefore, discretion is used for the selection.
2. Extract the maturity-related policies.
First, search for the policies whose narratives contain “day”, “week”, “month”,
“quarter”, “year”, “short”, and “long”. Second, label whether it targets short-
term (intending to lengthening the average maturity) or long-term (intending
to shortening the average maturity).
3. Each policy is characterized by three labels: the direction of transaction, whether
it is a tightening or easing, whether it is associated with short-term, or long-term,
or independent.
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Proof of Proposition 1
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t = Γ(1− γ) f γt + qSt dSt+1 + qLt (dLt+1 − δdLt )
(14)



















Proof. From (A.9) - (A.11) to (A.1) - (A.10):
From cTt , c
N
t , we can define λt using (A.1) and pt using (A.2). Then, we set µ = 0
which validates (A.5) and (A.6), and we choose τSt , τ
L
t according to (A.3) and (A.4).
With pt satisfying (A.2), (A.7) is equivalent to (A.11).
From (A.1) - (A.10) to (A.9) - (A.11): plugging (A.2) to (A.7) yields (A.11).
Lemma 1 suggests that the regulated competitive equilibrium is equivalent to Ram-
sey equilibrium with properly defined taxes, which essentially proves that Ramsey
equilibrium can be decentralized.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose that the collateral constraint does not bind, then the corresponding































With risk-neutral foreign investor, the long-term debt’s price is associated with the







Therefore, if the covariance term is positive13, there will not be long-term debt,
otherwise, there will not be short-term debt.
Ruling Out Multiple Equilibria
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016) show that under plausible calibrations, there exist
multiple equilibria with both underborrowing and overborrowing. Multiple equilib-
ria stem from a self-fullfiling decline in nontradable goods price leading to reduction
in collateral value, consumption, and nontradable goods price in a compatible feed-
back loop. Specifically, when collateral constraint binds, tradable goods consumption











)1/ξ] ≡ f (cTt ) (17)
As discussed in Jeanne and Korinek (2012) and Benigno et al. (2016), when the elastic-
ity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods is less than one, a suffi-
cient condition of unique equilibrium requires limcTt →0 f
′(cTt ) = 0, limcTt →∞ f
′(cTt ) =
∞, and f ′(cTt )
∣∣
cTt = f (c
T
t )
> 1. These conditions are satisfied in the calibration.
Intuitively, given tradable and nontradable goods are complements, when extra
borrowing increases tradable consumption, nontradable consumption will rise si-
multaneously. As a result, nontradable price goes up, so will collateral value and
borrowing limit. If they are substitutes, then borrowing increase will lead to nontrad-
able consumption decrease and reduce borrowing limit.
13In the case without interest rate shock, the covariance term is zero, so the maturity structure is
undetermined.
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Another multiple equilibria issue that might arise in the model is that the debt
portfolio could be undetermined when collateral constraint binds. This can be ruled
out if for each portfolio supporting cTt under binding collateral constraint there exists
a unique level of short-term debt (or long-term debt) given the level of long-term
debt (short-term debt). The condition is satisfied in the model because the total debt
value is a linear combination of short- and long-term debt given their prices.
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Figure A3: Dynamics and Optimal Capital Controls in Boom-Bust Periods







Tradable Goods Production Profit
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Note: This chart plots the dynamics of key aggregate variables and optimal capital controls in
boom-bust periods.
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Figure A4: Dynamics and Optimal Capital Controls in Crises Periods
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Note: This chart plots the dynamics of key aggregate variables and optimal capital controls in
financial crises periods under both SDF shock and yN shock.
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Categorization of Transaction and Flows
From Compilation Guide, AREAER 2012.
• Capital market instrument: shares and other securities of a participating nature
and bonds and other securities with an original maturity of more than one year.
• Money market instrument: securities with an original maturity of one year or
less and includes short-term instruments, such as certificates of deposit and
bills of exchange. The category also includes treasury bills and other short-term
government paper, bankers’ acceptances, commercial paper, interbank deposits,
and repurchase agreements.
• Derivatives: operations in other negotiable instruments and nonsecured claims
not covered under the above subsections. These may include operations in
rights; warrants; financial options and futures; secondary market operations in
other financial claims (including sovereign loans, mortgage loans, commercial
credits, negotiable instruments originating as loans, receivables, and discounted
bills of trade); forward operations (including those in foreign exchange); swaps
of bonds and other debt securities; credits and loans; and other swaps (e.g.,
interest rate, debt/equity, equity/debt, foreign currency, and swaps of any of
the instruments listed above). Also included are operations in foreign exchange
without any other underlying transaction (spot or forward trading on the foreign
exchange markets, forward cover operations, etc.).
• Credit transaction: operations directly linked with international trade trans-
actions or with the rendering of international services.. Credits other than
commercial credits granted by all residents, including banks, to nonresidents,
or vice versa. Guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities provided by
residents to nonresidents and vice versa. It also includes securities pledged for
payment or performance of a contract such as warrants, performance bonds, and
standby letters of credit and financial backup facilities that are credit facilities
used as a guarantee for independent financial operations.
• FDI: investments for the purpose of establishing lasting economic relations both
abroad by residents and domestically by nonresidents. These investments are
essentially for the purpose of producing goods and services, and, in particular,
in order to allow investor participation in the management of an enterprise.
The category includes the creation or extension of a wholly owned enterprise,
subsidiary, or branch and the acquisition of full or partial ownership of a new
or existing enterprise that results in effective influence over the operations of
the enterprise.
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The Procedure of Constructing Measures of Capital
Control from "Changes" Section
The construction takes the following steps.
1. Extract the narratives of policies regarding capital transaction in the "Changes
in the previous year" at the end of country profile from AREAER.
Post-1998 years are directly downloaded from AREAER website. From 1983
to 1998 is extracted manually from each AREAER. Prior to 1983, the policies
are listed in the chronological manner without indicating whether it is about
capital transaction or not. Therefore, discretion is used for the selection.
2. Each policy is characterized by three labels: the type of transaction, the direction
of transaction, whether it is a tightening or easing.
Transaction types: FDI; credit transaction; capital market instrument/money
market instrument/financial derivatives
Direction types: inflow; outflow
3. Extract the maturity-related policies.
First, search for the policies whose narratives contain "day", "week", "month",
"quarter", "year", "short", and "long". Second, label whether it targets short-term
(intending to lengthening the average maturity) or long-term (intending to
shortening the average maturity).
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Table C1: Cross-correlation table
Variables corruption rule of political voice regulation government
control law stability accountability quality efficiency
corruption control 1.00
rule of law 0.82 1.00
(0.00)
political stability 0.94 0.77 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
voice accountability 0.78 0.63 0.75 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
regulation quality 0.96 0.81 0.92 0.83 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
gov efficiency 0.96 0.81 0.93 0.73 0.95 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: This table examines the correlation among different measures of institutional
quality. The significant level is shown in parenthesess.
Table C2: Summary Statistics for External Financing
mean sd min max N
equity/total liability 0.43 0.16 0.06 0.80 1331
long-term debt/total debt 0.55 0.22 0.00 1.00 885
institution quality 0.50 0.85 -1.18 1.99 1331
real GDP per capita 9.38 1.20 6.01 11.61 1331
private credit/GDP 0.74 0.51 0.04 2.62 1331
trade/GDP 0.99 0.72 0.19 4.46 1331
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Table C3: Summary Statistics of Worldscope firms
Variable N mean sd min max
equity/total liability 121795 .458 .186 0 .932
long-term debt/total debt 121795 .511 .329 0 1
institutional quality 121795 .763 .802 -1.477 1.985
corruption control 121795 .887 .985 -1.412 2.557
government efficiency 121795 1.078 .764 -1.36 2.431
political stability 121795 .275 .801 -2.806 1.66
regulation quality 121795 .899 .767 -1.923 2.263
rule of law 121795 .908 .851 -1.777 2.12
voice accountability 121795 .533 .98 -1.863 1.826
liquidity 121795 3.843 7.719 -.142 53.084
size 121795 19.002 2.494 12.072 26.064
growth 121795 .145 .325 -.642 4.818
fixed asset 121795 3.228 2.151 0 9.301
profit 121795 1.893 3.585 -149.126 24.137
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Table C4: Country Composition of Worldscope Sample
country name Percent Cum. country name Percent Cum.
Argentina 0.38 0.38 Kuwait 0.12 61.28
Australia 2.35 2.73 Latvia 0.04 61.32
Austria 0.37 3.1 Lithuania 0.06 61.39
Bahamas 0.02 3.12 Luxembourg 0.2 61.59
Bahrain 0.02 3.14 Macedonia 0.05 61.64
Bangladesh 0.05 3.2 Malaysia 3.85 65.49
Barbados 0.02 3.21 Malta 0.03 65.51
Belgium 0.47 3.69 Mauritius 0.04 65.56
Brazil 1.43 5.16 Mexico 0.81 66.36
Bulgaria 0.3 5.46 Morocco 0.15 66.52
Canada 2.18 7.65 Netherlands 0.84 67.36
Chile 0.16 7.8 New Zealand 0.33 67.69
China 11.46 19.26 Nigeria 0.07 67.76
Croatia 0.19 19.47 Norway 0.55 68.32
Cyprus 0.13 19.6 Peru 0.51 69.51
Czech Republic 0.06 19.67 Philippines 0.5 70.01
Denmark 0.58 20.24 Poland 1.23 71.24
Egypt 0.28 20.52 Portugal 0.24 71.49
Estonia 0.05 20.58 Russian Federation 1.34 72.88
Fiji 0.03 20.61 Saudi Arabia 0.33 73.22
Finland 0.71 21.31 Serbia 0.07 73.28
France 3 24.31 Singapore 2.25 75.53
Germany 2.3 26.62 Slovakia 0.02 75.56
Greece 0.89 27.52 Slovenia 0.11 75.67
Hong Kong 3.12 30.64 South Africa 1.47 77.13
Hungary 0.09 30.73 Spain 0.7 77.83
Iceland 0.05 30.78 Sri Lanka 0.35 78.18
India 6.84 37.62 Sweden 1.2 79.38
Indonesia 0.02 37.64 Switzerland 1 80.38
Ireland 0.36 38 Thailand 1.85 82.23
Israel 0.94 38.94 Tunisia 0.09 82.32
Italy 1.13 40.07 Turkey 0.73 83.05
Jamaica 0.02 40.09 Ukraine 0.05 83.1
Japan 20.73 60.82 United Kingdom 4.23 87.33
Jordan 0.16 60.98 United States 12.67 100
Korea (South) 0.1 61.16
Total 121795
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Table C5: Summary Statistics of Compustat firms
Variable mean sd min max N
external equity/total liability 0.43 0.166 -0.493 0.76 11134
long-term debt/total debt 0.868 0.208 0 1 11134
internal equity/total liability 0.003 0.004 -0.011 0.082 11134
institutional quality 1.287 0.109 -1.01 1.852 11134
liquidity 0.085 0.086 0 0.686 11134
size 7.751 1.512 2.417 13.089 11134
growth 0.061 0.147 -0.789 0.581 11134
fixed asset 0.782 0.2 0.127 1 11134









Proposition 1. The entrepreneur will propose debt contract based on the project’s produc-
tivity. If θ < θ∗, long-term debt will be implemented. If θ > θ∗, short-term debt will be
implemented. If θ = θ∗, the entrepreneur will be indifferent between the two contracts. θ∗ is
determined by (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5).
Proof. The no deviation condition for the entrepreneurs who choose long-term debt
is proved in the main context by equation (3.4). What remains is the no deviation
condition for the entrepreneurs who engage in short-term, and it boils down to show
that the face value of the rollover short-term debt is lower than the long-term debt.
Intuitively, the long-term debt ends up with the low productivity firms so that the
creditors demand high face value. Since the short-term financing entrepreneurs have
high productivity projects, the creditor will be willing to sign up for a lower face
value given the same return of return (1+ r∗)2. Therefore, to maximize their profit,
the entrepreneurs will choose the lower face value, i.e. the short-term debt.
Formatting the intuition, we can show that d02(θ∗) > d12 for any θ > θ∗ based on






1− θ + θd02(θ∗)
)
dθ = (1+ r∗)2
(1− θ) + θd12 = (1+ r∗)
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Internal Financing and External Financing
The benchmark model in Section 2 can be extended to incorporate internal financing,
following Kaplan and Zingales (1997). The entrepreneurs now have two options in
financing the project: internal fund I whose maximal amount is I¯ and external fund
E. Suppose that the payoff is a function of total financing (including both internal
and external fund) and project productivity θ, denoted by F(I , θ), where I = I + E.
Also, we assume that the marginal product of investment increases with productivity.
External financing is associated with extra financing cost which is well-justified by
the literature such as Hennessy and Whited (2007) and Lyandres (2007). We assume
that the cost C(E, g) increases with the amount of external financing E, decreases
with institutional quality g, and the marginal cost of external financing decreases
with institutional quality g but increases with the amount of external financing E.
The opportunity cost of internal financing is the same as external financing, which is
equal to r∗. Therefore, the profit maximization problem can be specified as follows.
max F(I , θ)− C(E, g)− (1+ r∗)I
s.t. I = I + E
I ≤ I¯, E ≥ 0
The first order conditions are
F1(I , θ) = 1+ r∗ + ζ I (18)
F1(I , θ) + ζE = 1+ r∗ + C1(E, g) (19)
where ζ I , ζE ≥ 0 are the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraint I ≤ I¯ and E ≥ 0,
respectively. Since the marginal product of investment increases with productivity, i.e.
F12(I , θ) > 0, from (6), we can see higher productivity projects will use up internal
financing and continue investing with external financing. Furthermore, note that the
marginal cost of external financing is higher with lower institutional quality g, (7)








Going Beyond Listed Firms
In all countries, firms that are not listed on a stock exchange outnumber those that are.
We now make an attempt to compare the role of governance quality in determining
the capital structure of these two types of firms. Data on non-listed firms are generally
harder to come by since they do not face the same type of reporting requirements as
their listed counterparts. For many European countries, Amadeus database provides
information on both listed and private firms. The firm-level information of Amadeus
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Table C6: Summary Statistics of Amadeus Firms
mean sd min max N
equity/total liability 0.25 0.26 -0.85 1.00 3218433
long-term debt/total debt 0.65 0.30 0.00 1.00 3218433
institutional quality 0.82 0.57 -0.81 1.99 3218433
liquidity 0.08 0.12 0.00 1.00 3218433
size 14.24 2.17 6.91 19.83 3218433
growth 0.22 1.24 -1.00 21.16 3218433
fixed asset 0.46 0.31 0.00 1.00 3218433
profit 0.04 0.12 -3.06 1.34 3218433
long-term debt (industry) 0.75 0.07 0.00 1.00 3218433
equity (industry) 0.22 0.05 0.02 15.93 3218433
comes from various resources, for instance, Creditreform, national statistic agencies
such as Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania and National Bank of Bel-
gium. The criteria of firm selection vary country by country, and the sorts of criterion
involves firm size, types of firm, etc. For instance, Bulgaria firm sample requires "All
companies, which match 2 of the following 3 criteria: at least 50 persons staff, total
assets at least euro 500,000, turnover at least euro 1,000,000", while Hungary solicits
"Private and public limited liability companies, general and limited partnerships,
cooperatives have to file accounts to the State Authorities".
We employ a specification that includes both firm fixed effects and year fixed
effects, and cluster all standard errors at the country level. Table C8 reports the
regression results. The baseline estimates, as presented in the first and third columns,
suggest a strong positive relationship between capital structure and institutional
quality, and the magnitude is close that of Worldscope.
In the second and fourth columns, we add a dummy for listed firms in order to
account for possible differences between listed and non-listed firms. The estimates
show that high institutional quality benefits the listed firms more in terms of raising
equity and long-term debt. The consistency between the Worldscope sample and the
Amadeus sample provides strong support for the robustness of the close relationship
between institutional quality and capital structure regardless of the firm’s advantage
in access to the financial markets.
FDI and Equity Portfolio Investment
In the analysis of external equity financing and institutional quality, we define equity
financing as the sum of FDI and equity portfolio financing because FDI is essentially
equity financing with a larger magnitude (ownership of 10 percent of the ordinary
shares or voting stock is the criterion for determining the existence of an FDI). To
check whether the results are robust to different definitions of equity financing, we
separate FDI and equity portfolio financing and analyze their relationship with in-
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Table C7: Country Composition of Amadeus Sample
total share private firm share list firm share
Belarus 0.01 100 0
Belgium 0.38 96.2 3.8
Bulgaria 0.78 92.2 7.8
Switzerland 0.3 97 3
Cyprus 5.12 48.8 51.2
Czech Republic 0.03 99.7 0.3
Denmark 0.47 95.3 4.7
Estonia 0.18 98.2 1.8
Finland 0.65 93.5 6.5
France 0.58 94.2 5.8
Germany 0.38 96.2 3.8
Greece 2.76 72.4 27.6
Italy 0.01 99.9 0.1
Hungary 0.16 98.4 1.6
Iceland 0.5 95 5
Ireland 0.3 97 3
Lithuania 0.17 98.3 1.7
Latvia 0.26 97.4 2.6
Liechtenstein 0.31 96.9 3.1
Luxembourg 0 100 0
Macedonia 0.53 94.7 5.3
Malta 5.73 42.7 57.3
Netherlands 0.66 93.4 6.6
Norway 0.1 99 1
Poland 0.34 96.6 3.4
Portugal 2.38 76.2 23.8
Serbia 0.19 98.1 1.9
Slovakia 4.83 51.7 48.3
Slovenia 0.27 97.3 2.7
Spain 0.26 97.4 2.6
Sweden 0.39 96.1 3.9
Switzerland 1.18 88.2 11.8
Turkey 2.21 77.9 22.1
Ukraine 1.38 86.2 13.8
United Kingdom 0.67 93.3 6.7
Total 100 (3218433 obs)
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Table C8: Capital Structure of Domestic Financing and Institutional Quality
equity long-term debt
baseline +listed interaction baseline +listed interaction
institutional quality 0.020∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ -0.019
(0.006) (0.005) (0.030) (0.019)
listed (dummy) 0.223∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.024)
listed× institutional quality 0.024∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.029)
liquidity 0.113∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.019) (0.005) (0.004)
size 0.000 -0.001 0.008∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
growth -0.005∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
fixed asset 0.057∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.031) (0.038) (0.007)
profit 0.413∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗
(0.083) (0.090) (0.004) (0.024)
ln GDP per capita 0.005 0.002∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.004) (0.000) (0.022) (0.006)
inflation 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.005) (0.000) (0.012) (0.006)
financial development -1.448 0.427 -0.984 0.522
(1.046) (0.218) (0.845) (0.322)
tax rate 0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006)
equity (industry) 0.210∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗
(0.042) (0.038)
long-term debt (industry) 0.281∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.024)
N 3218433 3218433 3218433 3218433
CountryFE Y Y Y Y
FirmFE Y Y Y Y
YearFE Y Y Y Y
IndTimeTrend Y Y Y Y
Note: This table examines the relationship between firm-level capital structure and institu-
tional quality. The first three columns are for equity financing, and the last three are regarding
long-term debt financing. Column (1) and (3) are the baseline fixed effect regression with
controlling the industry capital structure’s time trend, and column (2) and (4) add the listed
firm dummy and its interaction with institutional quality. Standard errors are clustered at
country level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
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stitutional quality. As shown in Table C9, the IV regression and panel regression
confirm the positive relationship between FDI/equity portfolio investment and insti-
tutional quality, and that the improvement in institutional quality has larger effect on
stimulating FDI.
Table C9: FDI, Equity Portfolio Investment, and Institutional Quality
FDI equity portfolio investment
ols IV panel ols IV panel
gov_q -0.022 0.353∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.007 0.060∗∗ 0.029∗
(0.032) (0.157) (0.032) (0.004) (0.021) (0.016)
rgdp_per -0.001 -0.136∗∗∗ 0.060 0.014 -0.013 0.050∗
(0.012) (0.024) (0.064) (0.016) (0.027) (0.026)
fin -0.087 -0.298∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ 0.064 0.054 -0.024∗∗
(0.048) (0.123) (0.034) (0.062) (0.063) (0.012)
trade 0.050∗∗ 0.066 0.050 -0.004 -0.055∗ -0.010
(0.008) (0.050) (0.037) (0.009) (0.031) (0.008)
N 123 79 1331 123 79 1331
First stage regression




Note: This table examines the relationship between FDI, equity portfolio investment,
and institutional quality. The first three columns are for FDI, and the last three
are regarding equity portfolio investment. Column (1) and (4) are cross-section
least square estimations, column (2) and (5) are the IV 2SLS results of language
segmentation on the cross-section sample, and column (3) and (6) are the panel
fixed effect results. Standard errors are clustered at country level for OLS and IV,
at country-year level for panel regression, as reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate significance level 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Nonlinear Implications of the Model
Besides the positive correlation between institutional quality and equity financing
and long-term debt financing, the simulation of the model (Figure 3.2) indicates that
the impact of institutional quality varies across different values of the capital structure.
In Figure C1, we plot how each quantile of the capital structure distribution changes
with institutional quality improvement. A natural question would be whether the
theoretical distributional effects coincide with the empirical counterpart or not. To
answer this question, we use the listed firms’ sample and conduct the series of
quantile regressions. As shown in Figure C2, the empirical quantile results qualitative
fit well with the theoretical counterparts.
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Figure C1: Changes in Capital Structure Distribution To Institutional Quality Im-
provement
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